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Covert and secret quantum key distribution aims at generating information-theoretically secret
bits between distant legitimate parties in a manner that remains provably undetectable by an ad-
versary. We propose a framework in which to precisely define and analyze such an operation, and
we show that covert and secret key expansion is possible. For fixed and known classical-quantum
channels, we develop and analyze protocols based on forward and reverse reconciliation. When the
adversary applies the same quantum channel independently on each transmitted quantum state,
akin to a collective attack in the quantum key distribution literature, we propose a protocol that
achieves covert and secret key expansion under mild restrictions. The crux of our approach is the
use of information reconciliation and privacy amplification techniques that are able to process the
sparse signals required for covert operation and whose Shannon entropy scales as the square root
of their length. In particular, our results show that the coordination required between legitimate
parties to achieve covert communication can be achieved with a negligible number of secret key bits.
I. INTRODUCTION
Securing communications has become an essential re-
quirement in modern communication systems. Secrecy,
i.e, the ability to prevent unauthorized parties from ex-
tracting the information content of a signal, is typically
enforced using conventional computationally-secure en-
cryption although Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) re-
mains to date the only approach to unconditional se-
crecy [1, 2]. Another desirable feature of secure com-
munications is covertness, i.e., the ability to hide the
presence of communication signals from an unauthorized
party and provably avoid detection [3]. While secrecy
has been largely explored for quantum communications
both theoretically and experimentally, the mechanisms
required to achieve covertness are still much less under-
stood.
Covertness, also referred to as low probability of de-
tection, is conceptually related to classical and quantum
steganography [4–7], by which legitimate parties embed
a message into a covertext then disclosed to an adver-
sary [8]. In many quantum steganography protocols, an
innocent quantum state, in the form a codeword from a
quantum error-control code, is used as the cover to embed
another quantum state. The embedding is performed to
simulate the transmission of an innocent state through
a noisy channel and relies on shared secret keys with
well characterized rates. A crucial assumption in these
quantum steganography protocols is that the true physi-
cal channel is better than what the adversary expects. In
covert communications, however, the role of the covertext
is played by the communication channel, which intro-
duces noise and imperfections that are outside the control
of and only statistically known to the transmitter. There
has been a recent surge of interest for covert communi-
cations, which has led to the discovery of a “square-root
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law” similar to that in steganography [5] in both classi-
cal [9–11] and quantum settings [12–15]. The square-root
law, according to which the number of covert bits can
only scale with the square-root of the number of channel
uses, has also been experimentally validated in an optical
test-bed [12]. The authors of [12] also showed that, for
a bosonic channel, covert communication is impossible
without sources of imperfection in the adversary’s obser-
vations as the detection of a single photon would indicate
with certainty the existence of the communication. The
possibility of quantum covert and secret key generation
was recently explored [16–18] but has led to the rather
pessimistic conclusion that “covert QKD consumes more
secret bits than it can generate” [16].
Our main contribution is to offer a more nuanced and
optimistic perspective and show that covert and secret
key expansion is actually possible over quantum chan-
nels. The intuition behind our approach is the follow-
ing. In layman’s terms, the covertness constraint requires
the number of qubit transmissions to scale as O(
√
T ) for
T channel uses [12]. A crucial characteristic of earlier
works [12, 16] is that the scaling is ensured by having
the legitimate parties coordinate the sparse transmission
of
√
T qubits in channel uses chosen secretly and uni-
formly at random out of T . Unfortunately, the secret
key size required to select these secret channel uses scales
as Ω(
√
T log T ) and necessarily exceeds the number of
covert bits that one can hope to obtain, which scales
as Ω(
√
T ). In contrast, we introduce more sophisticated
coding schemes for information reconciliation and privacy
amplification that do not require such coordination and
are able to directly process the sparse and diffuse statis-
tical information content of covert signals. The proto-
cols that we present do not yet offer the secrecy levels
of state-of-the art QKD against coherent attacks but al-
ready achieve covert and secret key expansion and might
pave the way to more broadly applicable protocols.
Our results are developed in three steps as follows. We
first lay out a precise model for quantum covert and se-
cret key generation that captures a wide range of attacks



















2along with quantifiable metrics to assess the performance
of a covert and secret key generation protocol over quan-
tum channels. The main distinction with previous mod-
els [16–18] is the inclusion of the public communication
required for information reconciliation in the analysis;
specifically, since an adversary may devise a hypothesis
test for detection based on all its observations, the prob-
ability distribution of the public communication has to
be considered jointly with the quantum measurements
in evaluating covertness. We then proceed to analyze
an instance of quantum covert and secret key generation
in which the classical-quantum channels are fixed and
known, for which we can define and analyze the covert
and secret key capacity. We lower-bound the covert and
secret key capacity by developing coding schemes using
both forward and reverse reconciliation. The forward
reconciliation scheme can be constructed by a suitable
modification of established protocols for quantum covert
communication [14] to guarantee secrecy. In contrast,
the reverse reconciliation scheme requires a new approach
because of technical challenges precluding the direct use
of well-known results on information reconciliation and
privacy amplification for the sparse distribution needed
for covert communication. Finally, we consider an in-
stance of quantum covert and secret key generation in
which the classical-quantum channel is fixed but under
the control of the adversary and unknown to the legiti-
mate users. Under some conditions to limit the power of
the adversary, which we precisely characterize, we prove
the existence of covert and secret key generation proto-
cols consisting of a channel estimation phase followed by
a key-generation phase. The estimation phase is based
on a covert quantum tomography protocol that estimates
the required parameters of the channel and the key-
generation phase is based on universal results for covert
quantum communication. While covertness cannot be
unconditionally guaranteed, our protocol offers the legit-
imate parties with the ability to successfully abort be-
fore engaging in key generation. We do not instantiate
explicit codes but recent progress in designing codes for
covert communications [19] suggests that the protocols
described here can be implemented with low-complexity.
II. NOTATION
We briefly introduce the notation used throughout the
paper. For a finite-dimensional Hilbert space H, dimH
denotes the dimension of H, and L(H) denotes the space
of all linear operators from H to H. We denote the ad-
joint of an operator X ∈ L(H) by X†, and call X Her-
mitian if X = X†. X ∈ L(H) is positive (non-negative)
semi-definite, if it is Hermitian and all of its eigenval-
ues are positive (non-negative). D(H) denotes the set
of all density operators on H, i.e., all non-negative op-
erators with unit trace. For X,Y ∈ L(H), we write
X  Y (X  Y ), if X − Y is positive (non-negative)
semi-definite. For X ∈ H, let σmin(X) and σmax(X) de-
note the minimum and the maximum singular value of
X, respectively, and if X is Hermitian, let λmin(X) and
λmax(X) denote the minimum and maximum eigenvalue







tr (X†X). For a
Hermitian operator X ∈ L(H) with eigen-decomposition
X =
∑
x x|x〉〈x|, we define the projection {X  0} ,∑
x>0 |x〉〈x|. A quantum channel EA→B is a completely
positive and trace preserving linear map from L(HA) to
L(HB). An isomorphic extension of EA→B , UA→BE , sat-
isfies EA→B(ρA) = trE(UA→BEρAU†A→BE) for all ρA ∈D(HA). We denote the complementary channel of EA→B
by E†A→B(ρA) , EA→E(ρA) , trB(UA→BEρAU†A→BE),
which is well-defined and unique up to a unitary transfor-
mation [20]. A classical-quantum (cq)-channel is a map
from an abstract set X to D(H), denoted by x 7→ ρx.
For ρA ∈ D(HA) we define von Neumann entropy




. For ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗
HB), we define conditional von Neumann entropy
H(A|B)ρ , H(ρAB) − H(ρB) where ρB , trA(ρAB),
and quantum mutual information I(A;B)ρ , H(ρA) +
H(ρB)−H(ρAB). Similarly, we define conditional quan-
tum mutual informationI(A;B|C) , H(ρAC)+H(ρBC)−
H(ρABC)−H(ρC) for any ρABC ∈ D(HA ⊗HB ⊗HC).
If PX is a distribution on X and x 7→ ρx is a cq-channel,
we denote the Holevo information by









For ρ, σ ∈ D(H), the quantum relative entropy is
D(ρ‖σ) ,
{
tr (ρ (log ρ− log σ)) if supp(ρ) ⊂ supp(σ),
∞ otherwise,
(2)






)− 1 if supp(ρ) ⊂ supp(σ),
∞ otherwise.
(3)
III. FRAMEWORK FOR COVERT AND
SECRET KEY GENERATION OVER
CLASSICAL-QUANTUM CHANNELS
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider a setting in which
two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, desire to share a
secret key while avoiding detection from an adversary,
Eve, by exploiting one-way quantum channel and a two-
way classical authenticated public channel of unlimited
capacity. Specifically, in an entanglement-based repre-
sentation, over T time steps, Alice prepares a classical-
quantum state ρAA˜, possibly depending on public com-
munications, on a bipartite system described by a Hilbert
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<latexit sha1_ba se64="dtlXN6nXVZcJOMsHlMtK6cs4Uv g=">AAACX3icbVBNbxMxEHWWj5YCJYE T4mIRIXHpflQIOLYqB44FkbZSEqJZ72z Xqj9W9ixttMpP6RV+E0f+Cd5NDrRlJF tP7814nl9eK+kpTX8Ponv3Hzzc2n608 /jJ091nw9HzE28bJ3AirLLuLAePShqck CSFZ7VD0LnC0/ziqNNPf6Dz0ppvtKxx ruHcyFIKoEAthqOZq+z3dqaBqrxsD1er xXCcxmlf/C7INmDMNnW8GA3ezworGo2 GhALvp1la07wFR1IoXO3MGo81iAs4x2m ABjT6edt7X/E3gSl4aV04hnjP/jvRgv Z+qfPQ2Xn0t7WO/J82baj8OG+lqRtCI 9aLykZxsrwLghfSoSC1DACEk8ErFxU4E BTiurGFe9Lglq4IX+nfa5OJD02JxsoV UCSfnK1ze5V8RY/gRJWEy+o9BYRXe30k a2ZRNkZ0ufs4KF3S2e1c74KT/ThL4+z Lu/FBvMl8m71ir9lblrEP7IB9ZsdswgS 7ZNfsJ/s1+BNtRbvRcN0aDTYzL9iNil 7+Bb32uKw=</latexit><latexit sha1_ba se64="dtlXN6nXVZcJOMsHlMtK6cs4Uv g=">AAACX3icbVBNbxMxEHWWj5YCJYE T4mIRIXHpflQIOLYqB44FkbZSEqJZ72z Xqj9W9ixttMpP6RV+E0f+Cd5NDrRlJF tP7814nl9eK+kpTX8Ponv3Hzzc2n608 /jJ091nw9HzE28bJ3AirLLuLAePShqck CSFZ7VD0LnC0/ziqNNPf6Dz0ppvtKxx ruHcyFIKoEAthqOZq+z3dqaBqrxsD1er xXCcxmlf/C7INmDMNnW8GA3ezworGo2 GhALvp1la07wFR1IoXO3MGo81iAs4x2m ABjT6edt7X/E3gSl4aV04hnjP/jvRgv Z+qfPQ2Xn0t7WO/J82baj8OG+lqRtCI 9aLykZxsrwLghfSoSC1DACEk8ErFxU4E BTiurGFe9Lglq4IX+nfa5OJD02JxsoV UCSfnK1ze5V8RY/gRJWEy+o9BYRXe30k a2ZRNkZ0ufs4KF3S2e1c74KT/ThL4+z Lu/FBvMl8m71ir9lblrEP7IB9ZsdswgS 7ZNfsJ/s1+BNtRbvRcN0aDTYzL9iNil 7+Bb32uKw=</latexit><latexit sha1_ba se64="dtlXN6nXVZcJOMsHlMtK6cs4Uv g=">AAACX3icbVBNbxMxEHWWj5YCJYE T4mIRIXHpflQIOLYqB44FkbZSEqJZ72z Xqj9W9ixttMpP6RV+E0f+Cd5NDrRlJF tP7814nl9eK+kpTX8Ponv3Hzzc2n608 /jJ091nw9HzE28bJ3AirLLuLAePShqck CSFZ7VD0LnC0/ziqNNPf6Dz0ppvtKxx ruHcyFIKoEAthqOZq+z3dqaBqrxsD1er xXCcxmlf/C7INmDMNnW8GA3ezworGo2 GhALvp1la07wFR1IoXO3MGo81iAs4x2m ABjT6edt7X/E3gSl4aV04hnjP/jvRgv Z+qfPQ2Xn0t7WO/J82baj8OG+lqRtCI 9aLykZxsrwLghfSoSC1DACEk8ErFxU4E BTiurGFe9Lglq4IX+nfa5OJD02JxsoV UCSfnK1ze5V8RY/gRJWEy+o9BYRXe30k a2ZRNkZ0ufs4KF3S2e1c74KT/ThL4+z Lu/FBvMl8m71ir9lblrEP7IB9ZsdswgS 7ZNfsJ/s1+BNtRbvRcN0aDTYzL9iNil 7+Bb32uKw=</latexit><latexit sha1_ba se64="dtlXN6nXVZcJOMsHlMtK6cs4Uv g=">AAACX3icbVBNbxMxEHWWj5YCJYE T4mIRIXHpflQIOLYqB44FkbZSEqJZ72z Xqj9W9ixttMpP6RV+E0f+Cd5NDrRlJF tP7814nl9eK+kpTX8Ponv3Hzzc2n608 /jJ091nw9HzE28bJ3AirLLuLAePShqck CSFZ7VD0LnC0/ziqNNPf6Dz0ppvtKxx ruHcyFIKoEAthqOZq+z3dqaBqrxsD1er xXCcxmlf/C7INmDMNnW8GA3ezworGo2 GhALvp1la07wFR1IoXO3MGo81iAs4x2m ABjT6edt7X/E3gSl4aV04hnjP/jvRgv Z+qfPQ2Xn0t7WO/J82baj8OG+lqRtCI 9aLykZxsrwLghfSoSC1DACEk8ErFxU4E BTiurGFe9Lglq4IX+nfa5OJD02JxsoV UCSfnK1ze5V8RY/gRJWEy+o9BYRXe30k a2ZRNkZ0ufs4KF3S2e1c74KT/ThL4+z Lu/FBvMl8m71ir9lblrEP7IB9ZsdswgS 7ZNfsJ/s1+BNtRbvRcN0aDTYzL9iNil 7+Bb32uKw=</latexit>
⇢
eA
<latexit sha1_ba se64="rE/mAsMNI5TLNtzu/LuWCiAOoZ 0=">AAACa3icbVHbbtQwEPWmXEq5bek bF8liVYmX5oIQ5bEIHngsiG0rbZbVxJk 0Vu04sie0qyhP/Rpe4Wv4CP4BJ7sPtG UkW0fnzHhmjrNaSUdx/HsUbNy6fefu5 r2t+w8ePno83n5y5ExjBU6FUcaeZOBQy QqnJEnhSW0RdKbwODv70OvH39E6aaqv tKxxruG0koUUQJ5ajF+ktjTf2vRc5khS 5dimGqjMivZ913WL8SQO4yH4TZCswYS t43CxPXqb5kY0GisSCpybJXFN8xYsSaG w20obhzWIMzjFmYcVaHTzdtij47ueyX lhrD8V8YH9t6IF7dxSZz6zH9Jd13ryf 9qsoeLdvJVV3RBWYtWoaBQnw3tTeC4tC lJLD0BY6WflogQLgrx1V7pwRxrs0uZ+ leG9Npo6nxRpLG0OefTRmjozF9EXdAhW lJG/jN5TQHixN1iyYhZFU4n+D1zold7 p5LqvN8HR6zCJw+Tzm8lBuPZ8kz1jL9k rlrB9dsA+sUM2ZYJdsh/sJ/s1+hPsBE +D56vUYLSu2WFXItj9C5r7vjM=</late xit><latexit sha1_ba se64="rE/mAsMNI5TLNtzu/LuWCiAOoZ 0=">AAACa3icbVHbbtQwEPWmXEq5bek bF8liVYmX5oIQ5bEIHngsiG0rbZbVxJk 0Vu04sie0qyhP/Rpe4Wv4CP4BJ7sPtG UkW0fnzHhmjrNaSUdx/HsUbNy6fefu5 r2t+w8ePno83n5y5ExjBU6FUcaeZOBQy QqnJEnhSW0RdKbwODv70OvH39E6aaqv tKxxruG0koUUQJ5ajF+ktjTf2vRc5khS 5dimGqjMivZ913WL8SQO4yH4TZCswYS t43CxPXqb5kY0GisSCpybJXFN8xYsSaG w20obhzWIMzjFmYcVaHTzdtij47ueyX lhrD8V8YH9t6IF7dxSZz6zH9Jd13ryf 9qsoeLdvJVV3RBWYtWoaBQnw3tTeC4tC lJLD0BY6WflogQLgrx1V7pwRxrs0uZ+ leG9Npo6nxRpLG0OefTRmjozF9EXdAhW lJG/jN5TQHixN1iyYhZFU4n+D1zold7 p5LqvN8HR6zCJw+Tzm8lBuPZ8kz1jL9k rlrB9dsA+sUM2ZYJdsh/sJ/s1+hPsBE +D56vUYLSu2WFXItj9C5r7vjM=</late xit><latexit sha1_ba se64="rE/mAsMNI5TLNtzu/LuWCiAOoZ 0=">AAACa3icbVHbbtQwEPWmXEq5bek bF8liVYmX5oIQ5bEIHngsiG0rbZbVxJk 0Vu04sie0qyhP/Rpe4Wv4CP4BJ7sPtG UkW0fnzHhmjrNaSUdx/HsUbNy6fefu5 r2t+w8ePno83n5y5ExjBU6FUcaeZOBQy QqnJEnhSW0RdKbwODv70OvH39E6aaqv tKxxruG0koUUQJ5ajF+ktjTf2vRc5khS 5dimGqjMivZ913WL8SQO4yH4TZCswYS t43CxPXqb5kY0GisSCpybJXFN8xYsSaG w20obhzWIMzjFmYcVaHTzdtij47ueyX lhrD8V8YH9t6IF7dxSZz6zH9Jd13ryf 9qsoeLdvJVV3RBWYtWoaBQnw3tTeC4tC lJLD0BY6WflogQLgrx1V7pwRxrs0uZ+ leG9Npo6nxRpLG0OefTRmjozF9EXdAhW lJG/jN5TQHixN1iyYhZFU4n+D1zold7 p5LqvN8HR6zCJw+Tzm8lBuPZ8kz1jL9k rlrB9dsA+sUM2ZYJdsh/sJ/s1+hPsBE +D56vUYLSu2WFXItj9C5r7vjM=</late xit><latexit sha1_ba se64="rE/mAsMNI5TLNtzu/LuWCiAOoZ 0=">AAACa3icbVHbbtQwEPWmXEq5bek bF8liVYmX5oIQ5bEIHngsiG0rbZbVxJk 0Vu04sie0qyhP/Rpe4Wv4CP4BJ7sPtG UkW0fnzHhmjrNaSUdx/HsUbNy6fefu5 r2t+w8ePno83n5y5ExjBU6FUcaeZOBQy QqnJEnhSW0RdKbwODv70OvH39E6aaqv tKxxruG0koUUQJ5ajF+ktjTf2vRc5khS 5dimGqjMivZ913WL8SQO4yH4TZCswYS t43CxPXqb5kY0GisSCpybJXFN8xYsSaG w20obhzWIMzjFmYcVaHTzdtij47ueyX lhrD8V8YH9t6IF7dxSZz6zH9Jd13ryf 9qsoeLdvJVV3RBWYtWoaBQnw3tTeC4tC lJLD0BY6WflogQLgrx1V7pwRxrs0uZ+ leG9Npo6nxRpLG0OefTRmjozF9EXdAhW lJG/jN5TQHixN1iyYhZFU4n+D1zold7 p5LqvN8HR6zCJw+Tzm8lBuPZ8kz1jL9k rlrB9dsA+sUM2ZYJdsh/sJ/s1+hPsBE +D56vUYLSu2WFXItj9C5r7vjM=</late xit>
⇢B
<latexit sha1_base64="/AOnLxFFIq APW8kEdDC1jk+QxpE=">AAACX3icbVBNbxMxEHWWj5YCJYET4mIRIXHpflQIOFY tB44FkbZSEqJZ72zXqj9W9ixttMpP6RV+E0f+Cd5NDrRlJFtP7814nl9eK+kpTX 8Ponv3Hzzc2n608/jJ091nw9HzE28bJ3AirLLuLAePShqckCSFZ7VD0LnC0/ziq NNPf6Dz0ppvtKxxruHcyFIKoEAthqOZq+z3dqaBqrxsD1erxXCcxmlf/C7INmD MNnW8GA3ezworGo2GhALvp1la07wFR1IoXO3MGo81iAs4x2mABjT6edt7X/E3gS l4aV04hnjP/jvRgvZ+qfPQ2Xn0t7WO/J82baj8OG+lqRtCI9aLykZxsrwLghfSo SC1DACEk8ErFxU4EBTiurGFe9Lglq4IX+nfa5OJD02JxsoVUCSfnK1ze5V8RY/g RJWEy+o9BYRXe30ka2ZRNkZ0ufs4KF3S2e1c74KT/ThL4+zLu/FBvMl8m71ir9l blrEP7IB9ZsdswgS7ZNfsJ/s1+BNtRbvRcN0aDTYzL9iNil7+Bb/huK0=</late xit><latexit sha1_base64="/AOnLxFFIq APW8kEdDC1jk+QxpE=">AAACX3icbVBNbxMxEHWWj5YCJYET4mIRIXHpflQIOFY tB44FkbZSEqJZ72zXqj9W9ixttMpP6RV+E0f+Cd5NDrRlJFtP7814nl9eK+kpTX 8Ponv3Hzzc2n608/jJ091nw9HzE28bJ3AirLLuLAePShqckCSFZ7VD0LnC0/ziq NNPf6Dz0ppvtKxxruHcyFIKoEAthqOZq+z3dqaBqrxsD1erxXCcxmlf/C7INmD MNnW8GA3ezworGo2GhALvp1la07wFR1IoXO3MGo81iAs4x2mABjT6edt7X/E3gS l4aV04hnjP/jvRgvZ+qfPQ2Xn0t7WO/J82baj8OG+lqRtCI9aLykZxsrwLghfSo SC1DACEk8ErFxU4EBTiurGFe9Lglq4IX+nfa5OJD02JxsoVUCSfnK1ze5V8RY/g RJWEy+o9BYRXe30ka2ZRNkZ0ufs4KF3S2e1c74KT/ThL4+zLu/FBvMl8m71ir9l blrEP7IB9ZsdswgS7ZNfsJ/s1+BNtRbvRcN0aDTYzL9iNil7+Bb/huK0=</late xit><latexit sha1_base64="/AOnLxFFIq APW8kEdDC1jk+QxpE=">AAACX3icbVBNbxMxEHWWj5YCJYET4mIRIXHpflQIOFY tB44FkbZSEqJZ72zXqj9W9ixttMpP6RV+E0f+Cd5NDrRlJFtP7814nl9eK+kpTX 8Ponv3Hzzc2n608/jJ091nw9HzE28bJ3AirLLuLAePShqckCSFZ7VD0LnC0/ziq NNPf6Dz0ppvtKxxruHcyFIKoEAthqOZq+z3dqaBqrxsD1erxXCcxmlf/C7INmD MNnW8GA3ezworGo2GhALvp1la07wFR1IoXO3MGo81iAs4x2mABjT6edt7X/E3gS l4aV04hnjP/jvRgvZ+qfPQ2Xn0t7WO/J82baj8OG+lqRtCI9aLykZxsrwLghfSo SC1DACEk8ErFxU4EBTiurGFe9Lglq4IX+nfa5OJD02JxsoVUCSfnK1ze5V8RY/g RJWEy+o9BYRXe30ka2ZRNkZ0ufs4KF3S2e1c74KT/ThL4+zLu/FBvMl8m71ir9l blrEP7IB9ZsdswgS7ZNfsJ/s1+BNtRbvRcN0aDTYzL9iNil7+Bb/huK0=</late xit><latexit sha1_base64="/AOnLxFFIq APW8kEdDC1jk+QxpE=">AAACX3icbVBNbxMxEHWWj5YCJYET4mIRIXHpflQIOFY tB44FkbZSEqJZ72zXqj9W9ixttMpP6RV+E0f+Cd5NDrRlJFtP7814nl9eK+kpTX 8Ponv3Hzzc2n608/jJ091nw9HzE28bJ3AirLLuLAePShqckCSFZ7VD0LnC0/ziq NNPf6Dz0ppvtKxxruHcyFIKoEAthqOZq+z3dqaBqrxsD1erxXCcxmlf/C7INmD MNnW8GA3ezworGo2GhALvp1la07wFR1IoXO3MGo81iAs4x2mABjT6edt7X/E3gS l4aV04hnjP/jvRgvZ+qfPQ2Xn0t7WO/J82baj8OG+lqRtCI9aLykZxsrwLghfSo SC1DACEk8ErFxU4EBTiurGFe9Lglq4IX+nfa5OJD02JxsoVUCSfnK1ze5V8RY/g RJWEy+o9BYRXe30ka2ZRNkZ0ufs4KF3S2e1c74KT/ThL4+zLu/FBvMl8m71ir9l blrEP7IB9ZsdswgS7ZNfsJ/s1+BNtRbvRcN0aDTYzL9iNil7+Bb/huK0=</late xit>
⇢E
<latexit sha1_base64="2254xk8XCJ K9YaIkg6laX3L8Mwc=">AAACX3icbVBNbxMxEHWWj5YCJYET4mIRIXHpflQIOFZ qkTgWRNpKSYhmvbNdq/5Y2bO00So/pVf4TRz5J3g3OdCWkWw9vTfjeX55raSnNP 09iO7df/Bwa/vRzuMnT3efDUfPT7xtnMCJsMq6sxw8KmlwQpIUntUOQecKT/OLw 04//YHOS2u+0bLGuYZzI0spgAK1GI5mrrLf25kGqvKy/bRaLYbjNE774ndBtgF jtqnjxWjwflZY0Wg0JBR4P83SmuYtOJJC4Wpn1nisQVzAOU4DNKDRz9ve+4q/CU zBS+vCMcR79t+JFrT3S52Hzs6jv6115P+0aUPlx3krTd0QGrFeVDaKk+VdELyQD gWpZQAgnAxeuajAgaAQ140t3JMGt3RF+Er/XptMfGhKNFaugCI5crbO7VXyFT2C E1USLqv3FBBe7fWRrJlF2RjR5e7joHRJZ7dzvQtO9uMsjbMv78YH8SbzbfaKvWZ vWcY+sAP2mR2zCRPskl2zn+zX4E+0Fe1Gw3VrNNjMvGA3Knr5F8WiuLA=</late xit><latexit sha1_base64="2254xk8XCJ K9YaIkg6laX3L8Mwc=">AAACX3icbVBNbxMxEHWWj5YCJYET4mIRIXHpflQIOFZ qkTgWRNpKSYhmvbNdq/5Y2bO00So/pVf4TRz5J3g3OdCWkWw9vTfjeX55raSnNP 09iO7df/Bwa/vRzuMnT3efDUfPT7xtnMCJsMq6sxw8KmlwQpIUntUOQecKT/OLw 04//YHOS2u+0bLGuYZzI0spgAK1GI5mrrLf25kGqvKy/bRaLYbjNE774ndBtgF jtqnjxWjwflZY0Wg0JBR4P83SmuYtOJJC4Wpn1nisQVzAOU4DNKDRz9ve+4q/CU zBS+vCMcR79t+JFrT3S52Hzs6jv6115P+0aUPlx3krTd0QGrFeVDaKk+VdELyQD gWpZQAgnAxeuajAgaAQ140t3JMGt3RF+Er/XptMfGhKNFaugCI5crbO7VXyFT2C E1USLqv3FBBe7fWRrJlF2RjR5e7joHRJZ7dzvQtO9uMsjbMv78YH8SbzbfaKvWZ vWcY+sAP2mR2zCRPskl2zn+zX4E+0Fe1Gw3VrNNjMvGA3Knr5F8WiuLA=</late xit><latexit sha1_base64="2254xk8XCJ K9YaIkg6laX3L8Mwc=">AAACX3icbVBNbxMxEHWWj5YCJYET4mIRIXHpflQIOFZ qkTgWRNpKSYhmvbNdq/5Y2bO00So/pVf4TRz5J3g3OdCWkWw9vTfjeX55raSnNP 09iO7df/Bwa/vRzuMnT3efDUfPT7xtnMCJsMq6sxw8KmlwQpIUntUOQecKT/OLw 04//YHOS2u+0bLGuYZzI0spgAK1GI5mrrLf25kGqvKy/bRaLYbjNE774ndBtgF jtqnjxWjwflZY0Wg0JBR4P83SmuYtOJJC4Wpn1nisQVzAOU4DNKDRz9ve+4q/CU zBS+vCMcR79t+JFrT3S52Hzs6jv6115P+0aUPlx3krTd0QGrFeVDaKk+VdELyQD gWpZQAgnAxeuajAgaAQ140t3JMGt3RF+Er/XptMfGhKNFaugCI5crbO7VXyFT2C E1USLqv3FBBe7fWRrJlF2RjR5e7joHRJZ7dzvQtO9uMsjbMv78YH8SbzbfaKvWZ vWcY+sAP2mR2zCRPskl2zn+zX4E+0Fe1Gw3VrNNjMvGA3Knr5F8WiuLA=</late xit><latexit sha1_base64="2254xk8XCJ K9YaIkg6laX3L8Mwc=">AAACX3icbVBNbxMxEHWWj5YCJYET4mIRIXHpflQIOFZ qkTgWRNpKSYhmvbNdq/5Y2bO00So/pVf4TRz5J3g3OdCWkWw9vTfjeX55raSnNP 09iO7df/Bwa/vRzuMnT3efDUfPT7xtnMCJsMq6sxw8KmlwQpIUntUOQecKT/OLw 04//YHOS2u+0bLGuYZzI0spgAK1GI5mrrLf25kGqvKy/bRaLYbjNE774ndBtgF jtqnjxWjwflZY0Wg0JBR4P83SmuYtOJJC4Wpn1nisQVzAOU4DNKDRz9ve+4q/CU zBS+vCMcR79t+JFrT3S52Hzs6jv6115P+0aUPlx3krTd0QGrFeVDaKk+VdELyQD gWpZQAgnAxeuajAgaAQ140t3JMGt3RF+Er/XptMfGhKNFaugCI5crbO7VXyFT2C E1USLqv3FBBe7fWRrJlF2RjR5e7joHRJZ7dzvQtO9uMsjbMv78YH8SbzbfaKvWZ vWcY+sAP2mR2zCRPskl2zn+zX4E+0Fe1Gw3VrNNjMvGA3Knr5F8WiuLA=</late xit>
Y
<latexit sha1_base64="sogrQjltca 8XfpgEt1biirLjFiU=">AAACVnicbVDJbhNBEO2ZJGRhc8IxlxYWEpfMghBwjAQ HjgHhLNiWVdNTE7fSy6i7BsUa+S+4Jt8FP4PoGftAEkrq1tN7tb6iVtJTlv2O4o 3NrUfbO7t7j588ffZ8sH9w6m3jBI6EVdadF+BRSYMjkqTwvHYIulB4Vlx97PSzH +i8tOYbLWqcarg0spICKFDfJxpoXlTtxXI2GGZJ1gd/CPI1GLJ1nMz2o3eT0op GoyGhwPtxntU0bcGRFAqXe5PGYw3iCi5xHKABjX7a9isv+avAlLyyLjxDvGf/rW hBe7/QRcjsVvT3tY78nzZuqPowbaWpG0IjVoOqRnGyvLufl9KhILUIAISTYVcu5 uBAUHDpzhTuSYNbuDKc0vdr05EPSanGuSuhTD85Wxf2Ov2KHsGJeRo+q48UEF4f 9ZasmFnVGNHZ7ZOgdE7n9319CE7fJHmW5F/eDo+Ttec77JC9ZK9Zzt6zY/aZnbA RE8ywn+yG3Ua/oj/xVry9So2jdc0LdifiwV+vlrZR</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sogrQjltca 8XfpgEt1biirLjFiU=">AAACVnicbVDJbhNBEO2ZJGRhc8IxlxYWEpfMghBwjAQ HjgHhLNiWVdNTE7fSy6i7BsUa+S+4Jt8FP4PoGftAEkrq1tN7tb6iVtJTlv2O4o 3NrUfbO7t7j588ffZ8sH9w6m3jBI6EVdadF+BRSYMjkqTwvHYIulB4Vlx97PSzH +i8tOYbLWqcarg0spICKFDfJxpoXlTtxXI2GGZJ1gd/CPI1GLJ1nMz2o3eT0op GoyGhwPtxntU0bcGRFAqXe5PGYw3iCi5xHKABjX7a9isv+avAlLyyLjxDvGf/rW hBe7/QRcjsVvT3tY78nzZuqPowbaWpG0IjVoOqRnGyvLufl9KhILUIAISTYVcu5 uBAUHDpzhTuSYNbuDKc0vdr05EPSanGuSuhTD85Wxf2Ov2KHsGJeRo+q48UEF4f 9ZasmFnVGNHZ7ZOgdE7n9319CE7fJHmW5F/eDo+Ttec77JC9ZK9Zzt6zY/aZnbA RE8ywn+yG3Ua/oj/xVry9So2jdc0LdifiwV+vlrZR</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sogrQjltca 8XfpgEt1biirLjFiU=">AAACVnicbVDJbhNBEO2ZJGRhc8IxlxYWEpfMghBwjAQ HjgHhLNiWVdNTE7fSy6i7BsUa+S+4Jt8FP4PoGftAEkrq1tN7tb6iVtJTlv2O4o 3NrUfbO7t7j588ffZ8sH9w6m3jBI6EVdadF+BRSYMjkqTwvHYIulB4Vlx97PSzH +i8tOYbLWqcarg0spICKFDfJxpoXlTtxXI2GGZJ1gd/CPI1GLJ1nMz2o3eT0op GoyGhwPtxntU0bcGRFAqXe5PGYw3iCi5xHKABjX7a9isv+avAlLyyLjxDvGf/rW hBe7/QRcjsVvT3tY78nzZuqPowbaWpG0IjVoOqRnGyvLufl9KhILUIAISTYVcu5 uBAUHDpzhTuSYNbuDKc0vdr05EPSanGuSuhTD85Wxf2Ov2KHsGJeRo+q48UEF4f 9ZasmFnVGNHZ7ZOgdE7n9319CE7fJHmW5F/eDo+Ttec77JC9ZK9Zzt6zY/aZnbA RE8ywn+yG3Ua/oj/xVry9So2jdc0LdifiwV+vlrZR</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sogrQjltca 8XfpgEt1biirLjFiU=">AAACVnicbVDJbhNBEO2ZJGRhc8IxlxYWEpfMghBwjAQ HjgHhLNiWVdNTE7fSy6i7BsUa+S+4Jt8FP4PoGftAEkrq1tN7tb6iVtJTlv2O4o 3NrUfbO7t7j588ffZ8sH9w6m3jBI6EVdadF+BRSYMjkqTwvHYIulB4Vlx97PSzH +i8tOYbLWqcarg0spICKFDfJxpoXlTtxXI2GGZJ1gd/CPI1GLJ1nMz2o3eT0op GoyGhwPtxntU0bcGRFAqXe5PGYw3iCi5xHKABjX7a9isv+avAlLyyLjxDvGf/rW hBe7/QRcjsVvT3tY78nzZuqPowbaWpG0IjVoOqRnGyvLufl9KhILUIAISTYVcu5 uBAUHDpzhTuSYNbuDKc0vdr05EPSanGuSuhTD85Wxf2Ov2KHsGJeRo+q48UEF4f 9ZasmFnVGNHZ7ZOgdE7n9319CE7fJHmW5F/eDo+Ttec77JC9ZK9Zzt6zY/aZnbA RE8ywn+yG3Ua/oj/xVry9So2jdc0LdifiwV+vlrZR</latexit>
RA
<latexit  sha1_base64="KK 9hdQYmle7D3EvfBf dKOiPt0GE=">AAAC T3icbVDJThwxEHV PSFiyAOGYi8UIKRd 6iSLgCCKHHAnJANI wGVW7q2csvLTsas SoNZ+Qa/JdOfIluU XxNH0Iy5NsPb1Xdl W9vFLSU5reRr1nS8 9fLK+srr189frN+ sbm2zNvaydwIKyy7 iIHj0oaHJAkhReVQ 9C5wvP86njhn1+j 89KabzSrcKRhYmQp BVCQvp5+Pxpv9NM4 bcEfk6wjfdbhZLwZ 7V0WVtQaDQkF3g+ ztKJRA46kUDhfu6w 9ViCuYILDQA1o9KO mnXXOd4JS8NK6cA zxVv3/RQPa+5nOQ6 UGmvqH3kJ8yhvWVB 6MGmmqmtCIu0ZlrT hZvlicF9KhIDULB ISTYVYupuBAUIjnX hfuSYObuSKs0v7XJ AMfihKNU1dAkXxy tsrtTXKKHsGJaRIu q3cVEN7stpHcKeOy NmKRs4+DMw9JZw9z fUzOPsRZGmdfPvY P4y7zFfaObbP3LGP 77JB9ZidswASbsB/ sJ/sV/Y7+RH97XW kv6sgWu4fe6j+o1L Pc</latexit><latexit  sha1_base64="KK 9hdQYmle7D3EvfBf dKOiPt0GE=">AAAC T3icbVDJThwxEHV PSFiyAOGYi8UIKRd 6iSLgCCKHHAnJANI wGVW7q2csvLTsas SoNZ+Qa/JdOfIluU XxNH0Iy5NsPb1Xdl W9vFLSU5reRr1nS8 9fLK+srr189frN+ sbm2zNvaydwIKyy7 iIHj0oaHJAkhReVQ 9C5wvP86njhn1+j 89KabzSrcKRhYmQp BVCQvp5+Pxpv9NM4 bcEfk6wjfdbhZLwZ 7V0WVtQaDQkF3g+ ztKJRA46kUDhfu6w 9ViCuYILDQA1o9KO mnXXOd4JS8NK6cA zxVv3/RQPa+5nOQ6 UGmvqH3kJ8yhvWVB 6MGmmqmtCIu0ZlrT hZvlicF9KhIDULB ISTYVYupuBAUIjnX hfuSYObuSKs0v7XJ AMfihKNU1dAkXxy tsrtTXKKHsGJaRIu q3cVEN7stpHcKeOy NmKRs4+DMw9JZw9z fUzOPsRZGmdfPvY P4y7zFfaObbP3LGP 77JB9ZidswASbsB/ sJ/sV/Y7+RH97XW kv6sgWu4fe6j+o1L Pc</latexit><latexit  sha1_base64="KK 9hdQYmle7D3EvfBf dKOiPt0GE=">AAAC T3icbVDJThwxEHV PSFiyAOGYi8UIKRd 6iSLgCCKHHAnJANI wGVW7q2csvLTsas SoNZ+Qa/JdOfIluU XxNH0Iy5NsPb1Xdl W9vFLSU5reRr1nS8 9fLK+srr189frN+ sbm2zNvaydwIKyy7 iIHj0oaHJAkhReVQ 9C5wvP86njhn1+j 89KabzSrcKRhYmQp BVCQvp5+Pxpv9NM4 bcEfk6wjfdbhZLwZ 7V0WVtQaDQkF3g+ ztKJRA46kUDhfu6w 9ViCuYILDQA1o9KO mnXXOd4JS8NK6cA zxVv3/RQPa+5nOQ6 UGmvqH3kJ8yhvWVB 6MGmmqmtCIu0ZlrT hZvlicF9KhIDULB ISTYVYupuBAUIjnX hfuSYObuSKs0v7XJ AMfihKNU1dAkXxy tsrtTXKKHsGJaRIu q3cVEN7stpHcKeOy NmKRs4+DMw9JZw9z fUzOPsRZGmdfPvY P4y7zFfaObbP3LGP 77JB9ZidswASbsB/ sJ/sV/Y7+RH97XW kv6sgWu4fe6j+o1L Pc</latexit><latexit  sha1_base64="KK 9hdQYmle7D3EvfBf dKOiPt0GE=">AAAC T3icbVDJThwxEHV PSFiyAOGYi8UIKRd 6iSLgCCKHHAnJANI wGVW7q2csvLTsas SoNZ+Qa/JdOfIluU XxNH0Iy5NsPb1Xdl W9vFLSU5reRr1nS8 9fLK+srr189frN+ sbm2zNvaydwIKyy7 iIHj0oaHJAkhReVQ 9C5wvP86njhn1+j 89KabzSrcKRhYmQp BVCQvp5+Pxpv9NM4 bcEfk6wjfdbhZLwZ 7V0WVtQaDQkF3g+ ztKJRA46kUDhfu6w 9ViCuYILDQA1o9KO mnXXOd4JS8NK6cA zxVv3/RQPa+5nOQ6 UGmvqH3kJ8yhvWVB 6MGmmqmtCIu0ZlrT hZvlicF9KhIDULB ISTYVYupuBAUIjnX hfuSYObuSKs0v7XJ AMfihKNU1dAkXxy tsrtTXKKHsGJaRIu q3cVEN7stpHcKeOy NmKRs4+DMw9JZw9z fUzOPsRZGmdfPvY P4y7zFfaObbP3LGP 77JB9ZidswASbsB/ sJ/sV/Y7+RH97XW kv6sgWu4fe6j+o1L Pc</latexit>
RB
<latexit sha1_base64="qqT0dre6/3JSAe1YmLOCg2WwcD4=">AAACT3icbVD JThwxEHVPSFiyAOGYi8UIKRd6iSLgiCCHHAnJANIwGVW7q2csvLTsasSoNZ+Qa/JdOfIluUXxNH0Iy5NsPb1XdlW9vFLSU5reRr1nS89fLK+srr189frN+sbm2zNva ydwIKyy7iIHj0oaHJAkhReVQ9C5wvP86njhn1+j89KabzSrcKRhYmQpBVCQvp5+Pxpv9NM4bcEfk6wjfdbhZLwZ7V0WVtQaDQkF3g+ztKJRA46kUDhfu6w9ViCuYIL DQA1o9KOmnXXOd4JS8NK6cAzxVv3/RQPa+5nOQ6UGmvqH3kJ8yhvWVB6MGmmqmtCIu0ZlrThZvlicF9KhIDULBISTYVYupuBAUIjnXhfuSYObuSKs0v7XJAMfihKNU 1dAkXxytsrtTXKKHsGJaRIuq3cVEN7stpHcKeOyNmKRs4+DMw9JZw9zfUzOPsRZGmdfPvYP4y7zFfaObbP3LGP77JB9ZidswASbsB/sJ/sV/Y7+RH97XWkv6sgWu4 fe6j+qvbPd</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="qqT0dre6/3JSAe1YmLOCg2WwcD4=">AAACT3icbVD JThwxEHVPSFiyAOGYi8UIKRd6iSLgiCCHHAnJANIwGVW7q2csvLTsasSoNZ+Qa/JdOfIluUXxNH0Iy5NsPb1XdlW9vFLSU5reRr1nS89fLK+srr189frN+sbm2zNva ydwIKyy7iIHj0oaHJAkhReVQ9C5wvP86njhn1+j89KabzSrcKRhYmQpBVCQvp5+Pxpv9NM4bcEfk6wjfdbhZLwZ7V0WVtQaDQkF3g+ztKJRA46kUDhfu6w9ViCuYIL DQA1o9KOmnXXOd4JS8NK6cAzxVv3/RQPa+5nOQ6UGmvqH3kJ8yhvWVB6MGmmqmtCIu0ZlrThZvlicF9KhIDULBISTYVYupuBAUIjnXhfuSYObuSKs0v7XJAMfihKNU 1dAkXxytsrtTXKKHsGJaRIuq3cVEN7stpHcKeOyNmKRs4+DMw9JZw9zfUzOPsRZGmdfPvYP4y7zFfaObbP3LGP77JB9ZidswASbsB/sJ/sV/Y7+RH97XWkv6sgWu4 fe6j+qvbPd</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="qqT0dre6/3JSAe1YmLOCg2WwcD4=">AAACT3icbVD JThwxEHVPSFiyAOGYi8UIKRd6iSLgiCCHHAnJANIwGVW7q2csvLTsasSoNZ+Qa/JdOfIluUXxNH0Iy5NsPb1XdlW9vFLSU5reRr1nS89fLK+srr189frN+sbm2zNva ydwIKyy7iIHj0oaHJAkhReVQ9C5wvP86njhn1+j89KabzSrcKRhYmQpBVCQvp5+Pxpv9NM4bcEfk6wjfdbhZLwZ7V0WVtQaDQkF3g+ztKJRA46kUDhfu6w9ViCuYIL DQA1o9KOmnXXOd4JS8NK6cAzxVv3/RQPa+5nOQ6UGmvqH3kJ8yhvWVB6MGmmqmtCIu0ZlrThZvlicF9KhIDULBISTYVYupuBAUIjnXhfuSYObuSKs0v7XJAMfihKNU 1dAkXxytsrtTXKKHsGJaRIuq3cVEN7stpHcKeOyNmKRs4+DMw9JZw9zfUzOPsRZGmdfPvYP4y7zFfaObbP3LGP77JB9ZidswASbsB/sJ/sV/Y7+RH97XWkv6sgWu4 fe6j+qvbPd</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="qqT0dre6/3JSAe1YmLOCg2WwcD4=">AAACT3icbVD JThwxEHVPSFiyAOGYi8UIKRd6iSLgiCCHHAnJANIwGVW7q2csvLTsasSoNZ+Qa/JdOfIluUXxNH0Iy5NsPb1XdlW9vFLSU5reRr1nS89fLK+srr189frN+sbm2zNva ydwIKyy7iIHj0oaHJAkhReVQ9C5wvP86njhn1+j89KabzSrcKRhYmQpBVCQvp5+Pxpv9NM4bcEfk6wjfdbhZLwZ7V0WVtQaDQkF3g+ztKJRA46kUDhfu6w9ViCuYIL DQA1o9KOmnXXOd4JS8NK6cAzxVv3/RQPa+5nOQ6UGmvqH3kJ8yhvWVB6MGmmqmtCIu0ZlrThZvlicF9KhIDULBISTYVYupuBAUIjnXhfuSYObuSKs0v7XJAMfihKNU 1dAkXxytsrtTXKKHsGJaRIuq3cVEN7stpHcKeOyNmKRs4+DMw9JZw9zfUzOPsRZGmdfPvYP4y7zFfaObbP3LGP77JB9ZidswASbsB/sJ/sV/Y7+RH97XWkv6sgWu4 fe6j+qvbPd</latexit>
R






<latexit sha1_base64="OHsfffMPGog1vgpvOPJ7aqhDbc8=">AAACTXicbVD LShxBFK0e4zPRqFm6KTIEsrEfIUSXQlxkqeI4wjgMt6tvO4X1aKpui0MzX+A2flfW+ZDsQkhNzyx8XajicM59nrxS0lOa/o46S2+WV1bX1jfevtvcer+9s3vhbe0E9 oRV1l3m4FFJgz2SpPCycgg6V9jPb77P9P4tOi+tOadJhUMN10aWUgAF6rQ/2u6mcdoGfwmyBeiyRZyMdqJvV4UVtUZDQoH3gyytaNiAIykUTjeuao8ViBu4xkGABjT 6YdNuOuWfAlPw0rrwDPGWfVzRgPZ+ovOQqYHG/rk2I1/TBjWVh8NGmqomNGI+qKwVJ8tnZ/NCOhSkJgGAcDLsysUYHAgK5jyZwj1pcBNXhFPafk3S8yEp0Th2BRTJs bNVbu+SM/QIToyT8Fm9r4Dwbr+1ZM6MytqImcs+Dso0OJ099/UluPgSZ2mcnX7tHsULz9fYHvvIPrOMHbAj9oOdsB4TDNk9+8keol/Rn+hv9G+e2okWNR/Yk+is/g dX47Qt</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OHsfffMPGog1vgpvOPJ7aqhDbc8=">AAACTXicbVD LShxBFK0e4zPRqFm6KTIEsrEfIUSXQlxkqeI4wjgMt6tvO4X1aKpui0MzX+A2flfW+ZDsQkhNzyx8XajicM59nrxS0lOa/o46S2+WV1bX1jfevtvcer+9s3vhbe0E9 oRV1l3m4FFJgz2SpPCycgg6V9jPb77P9P4tOi+tOadJhUMN10aWUgAF6rQ/2u6mcdoGfwmyBeiyRZyMdqJvV4UVtUZDQoH3gyytaNiAIykUTjeuao8ViBu4xkGABjT 6YdNuOuWfAlPw0rrwDPGWfVzRgPZ+ovOQqYHG/rk2I1/TBjWVh8NGmqomNGI+qKwVJ8tnZ/NCOhSkJgGAcDLsysUYHAgK5jyZwj1pcBNXhFPafk3S8yEp0Th2BRTJs bNVbu+SM/QIToyT8Fm9r4Dwbr+1ZM6MytqImcs+Dso0OJ099/UluPgSZ2mcnX7tHsULz9fYHvvIPrOMHbAj9oOdsB4TDNk9+8keol/Rn+hv9G+e2okWNR/Yk+is/g dX47Qt</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OHsfffMPGog1vgpvOPJ7aqhDbc8=">AAACTXicbVD LShxBFK0e4zPRqFm6KTIEsrEfIUSXQlxkqeI4wjgMt6tvO4X1aKpui0MzX+A2flfW+ZDsQkhNzyx8XajicM59nrxS0lOa/o46S2+WV1bX1jfevtvcer+9s3vhbe0E9 oRV1l3m4FFJgz2SpPCycgg6V9jPb77P9P4tOi+tOadJhUMN10aWUgAF6rQ/2u6mcdoGfwmyBeiyRZyMdqJvV4UVtUZDQoH3gyytaNiAIykUTjeuao8ViBu4xkGABjT 6YdNuOuWfAlPw0rrwDPGWfVzRgPZ+ovOQqYHG/rk2I1/TBjWVh8NGmqomNGI+qKwVJ8tnZ/NCOhSkJgGAcDLsysUYHAgK5jyZwj1pcBNXhFPafk3S8yEp0Th2BRTJs bNVbu+SM/QIToyT8Fm9r4Dwbr+1ZM6MytqImcs+Dso0OJ099/UluPgSZ2mcnX7tHsULz9fYHvvIPrOMHbAj9oOdsB4TDNk9+8keol/Rn+hv9G+e2okWNR/Yk+is/g dX47Qt</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OHsfffMPGog1vgpvOPJ7aqhDbc8=">AAACTXicbVD LShxBFK0e4zPRqFm6KTIEsrEfIUSXQlxkqeI4wjgMt6tvO4X1aKpui0MzX+A2flfW+ZDsQkhNzyx8XajicM59nrxS0lOa/o46S2+WV1bX1jfevtvcer+9s3vhbe0E9 oRV1l3m4FFJgz2SpPCycgg6V9jPb77P9P4tOi+tOadJhUMN10aWUgAF6rQ/2u6mcdoGfwmyBeiyRZyMdqJvV4UVtUZDQoH3gyytaNiAIykUTjeuao8ViBu4xkGABjT 6YdNuOuWfAlPw0rrwDPGWfVzRgPZ+ovOQqYHG/rk2I1/TBjWVh8NGmqomNGI+qKwVJ8tnZ/NCOhSkJgGAcDLsysUYHAgK5jyZwj1pcBNXhFPafk3S8yEp0Th2BRTJs bNVbu+SM/QIToyT8Fm9r4Dwbr+1ZM6MytqImcs+Dso0OJ099/UluPgSZ2mcnX7tHsULz9fYHvvIPrOMHbAj9oOdsB4TDNk9+8keol/Rn+hv9G+e2okWNR/Yk+is/g dX47Qt</latexit>W
<latexit  sha1_base64="OH sfffMPGog1vgpvOP J7aqhDbc8=">AAAC TXicbVDLShxBFK0 e4zPRqFm6KTIEsrE fIUSXQlxkqeI4wjg Mt6tvO4X1aKpui0 MzX+A2flfW+ZDsQk hNzyx8XajicM59nr xS0lOa/o46S2+WV1 bX1jfevtvcer+9s 3vhbe0E9oRV1l3m4 FFJgz2SpPCycgg6V 9jPb77P9P4tOi+t OadJhUMN10aWUgAF 6rQ/2u6mcdoGfwmy BeiyRZyMdqJvV4UV tUZDQoH3gyytaNi AIykUTjeuao8ViBu 4xkGABjT6YdNuOuW fAlPw0rrwDPGWfV zRgPZ+ovOQqYHG/r k2I1/TBjWVh8NGmq omNGI+qKwVJ8tnZ/ NCOhSkJgGAcDLsy sUYHAgK5jyZwj1pc BNXhFPafk3S8yEp0 Th2BRTJsbNVbu+S M/QIToyT8Fm9r4Dw br+1ZM6MytqImcs+ Dso0OJ099/UluPgS Z2mcnX7tHsULz9f YHvvIPrOMHbAj9oO dsB4TDNk9+8keol/ Rn+hv9G+e2okWNR /Yk+is/gdX47Qt</ latexit><latexit  sha1_base64="OH sfffMPGog1vgpvOP J7aqhDbc8=">AAAC TXicbVDLShxBFK0 e4zPRqFm6KTIEsrE fIUSXQlxkqeI4wjg Mt6tvO4X1aKpui0 MzX+A2flfW+ZDsQk hNzyx8XajicM59nr xS0lOa/o46S2+WV1 bX1jfevtvcer+9s 3vhbe0E9oRV1l3m4 FFJgz2SpPCycgg6V 9jPb77P9P4tOi+t OadJhUMN10aWUgAF 6rQ/2u6mcdoGfwmy BeiyRZyMdqJvV4UV tUZDQoH3gyytaNi AIykUTjeuao8ViBu 4xkGABjT6YdNuOuW fAlPw0rrwDPGWfV zRgPZ+ovOQqYHG/r k2I1/TBjWVh8NGmq omNGI+qKwVJ8tnZ/ NCOhSkJgGAcDLsy sUYHAgK5jyZwj1pc BNXhFPafk3S8yEp0 Th2BRTJsbNVbu+S M/QIToyT8Fm9r4Dw br+1ZM6MytqImcs+ Dso0OJ099/UluPgS Z2mcnX7tHsULz9f YHvvIPrOMHbAj9oO dsB4TDNk9+8keol/ Rn+hv9G+e2okWNR /Yk+is/gdX47Qt</ latexit><latexit  sha1_base64="OH sfffMPGog1vgpvOP J7aqhDbc8=">AAAC TXicbVDLShxBFK0 e4zPRqFm6KTIEsrE fIUSXQlxkqeI4wjg Mt6tvO4X1aKpui0 MzX+A2flfW+ZDsQk hNzyx8XajicM59nr xS0lOa/o46S2+WV1 bX1jfevtvcer+9s 3vhbe0E9oRV1l3m4 FFJgz2SpPCycgg6V 9jPb77P9P4tOi+t OadJhUMN10aWUgAF 6rQ/2u6mcdoGfwmy BeiyRZyMdqJvV4UV tUZDQoH3gyytaNi AIykUTjeuao8ViBu 4xkGABjT6YdNuOuW fAlPw0rrwDPGWfV zRgPZ+ovOQqYHG/r k2I1/TBjWVh8NGmq omNGI+qKwVJ8tnZ/ NCOhSkJgGAcDLsy sUYHAgK5jyZwj1pc BNXhFPafk3S8yEp0 Th2BRTJsbNVbu+S M/QIToyT8Fm9r4Dw br+1ZM6MytqImcs+ Dso0OJ099/UluPgS Z2mcnX7tHsULz9f YHvvIPrOMHbAj9oO dsB4TDNk9+8keol/ Rn+hv9G+e2okWNR /Yk+is/gdX47Qt</ latexit><latexit  sha1_base64="OH sfffMPGog1vgpvOP J7aqhDbc8=">AAAC TXicbVDLShxBFK0 e4zPRqFm6KTIEsrE fIUSXQlxkqeI4wjg Mt6tvO4X1aKpui0 MzX+A2flfW+ZDsQk hNzyx8XajicM59nr xS0lOa/o46S2+WV1 bX1jfevtvcer+9s 3vhbe0E9oRV1l3m4 FFJgz2SpPCycgg6V 9jPb77P9P4tOi+t OadJhUMN10aWUgAF 6rQ/2u6mcdoGfwmy BeiyRZyMdqJvV4UV tUZDQoH3gyytaNi AIykUTjeuao8ViBu 4xkGABjT6YdNuOuW fAlPw0rrwDPGWfV zRgPZ+ovOQqYHG/r k2I1/TBjWVh8NGmq omNGI+qKwVJ8tnZ/ NCOhSkJgGAcDLsy sUYHAgK5jyZwj1pc BNXhFPafk3S8yEp0 Th2BRTJsbNVbu+S M/QIToyT8Fm9r4Dw br+1ZM6MytqImcs+ Dso0OJ099/UluPgS Z2mcnX7tHsULz9f YHvvIPrOMHbAj9oO dsB4TDNk9+8keol/ Rn+hv9G+e2okWNR /Yk+is/gdX47Qt</ latexit>
public authenticated channel
R
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Figure 1. Model of covert and secret key expansion
space HA⊗HA˜ and sends the sub-system A˜ to Bob. We
assume that for X ⊂ R, {|x〉A}x∈X is an orthonormal ba-
sis for HA, all eigenvectors of ρA are always in {|x〉}x∈X ,
and for any x ∈ X , the conditional state ρA˜x is fixed. For
simplicity, we restrict our attention to a two-dimensional
HA, i.e., X = {0, 1}, in which 0 represents an “innocent”
symbol, corresponding to the absence of communication,
while 1 represents an ‘non-innocent” symbol. We further
assume that the “start” (t = 1) and “stop” (t = T ) times
of the protocol are known to all parties and obtained
through other modalities, e.g., GPS signals. Eve expects
the product state (ρA˜0 )
⊗T when there is no communica-
tion and may modify the states according to a quantum
channel. We denote the entire state received by Bob and
acting on the product Hilbert space (HB)⊗T by ρB.
For the purpose of covert communications, we need to
distinguish protocols based on the type of Eve’s attacks.
In the most general case, Eve implements a coherent at-







with isomorphic extension UA˜→BE, in which Bob receives
ρB = EA˜→B(ρA˜) at the end of the transmission, and
therefore, no useful public communication can happen
during the transmission. Note that this has no impact
on QKD since no useful information is shared until the
end of the protocol. However, aborting the protocol in
the middle could be crucial to be undetectable. A less
powerful Eve can only implement collective attacks de-
scribed by quantum channels of the form EA˜→B = E⊗TA˜→B ,
i.e., Eve applies the same channel independently to each
state transmitted by Alice. In this case, we can as-
sume that Bob receives each state before Alice trans-
mits the next state, which allows meaningful public com-
munication during the transmission between Alice and
Bob. Throughout the paper, we consider two scenarios
for collective attacks based on Alice’s and Bob’s knowl-
edge about Eve’s attack. First, when Alice and Bob have
exact knowledge of the attack, we define an effective cq-
channel x 7→ ρBEx , with marginal cq-channels x → ρBx
and x → ρEx from Alice to Bob and Eve, respectively.
Second, when Eve’s channel EA˜→B is unknown, we still
consider effective cq-channels x 7→ ρBx and x 7→ ρEx where
ρBx and ρ
E
x are defined as EA→B(ρA˜x ) and E†A→B(ρA˜), re-
spectively, and are unknown to both Alice and Bob. Our
choice of ρEx accounts for the maximum amount of infor-
mation that Eve can possibly gain, i.e., the state corre-
sponding to a reference system for an isomorphic exten-
sion of the channel from Alice to Bob. Finally, Alice and
Bob have access to independent local sources of random-
ness, denoted by RA ∈ RA and RB ∈ RB , respectively,
as well as a source of secret key R ∈ R.
For simplicity, we describe the protocols with only re-
verse public communication, but extension to the gen-
eral case in which forward public communication is also
allowed would be possible. A protocol for key generation
operates in T time steps as follows. Alice and Bob draw
realizations rA, rB , and r of their local and common ran-
domness. Subsequently, in every state t ∈ J1, T K:
• Alice prepares a classical-quantum state ρAA˜ as ex-
plained earlier using her local randomness rA, the com-
mon randomness r, as well as past public messages
from Bob denoted (w1, · · · , wt−1) and sends ρA˜ to Bob
through the channel controlled by Eve;
• Bob performs a quantum measurement on his available
quantum state to obtain a classical measurement yt ∈
Y ⊂ R;
• Bob sends a message Wt ∈ Wt over the public channel
using his local randomness rB , the common random-
ness r, as well as past measurements yt−1. The choice
of alphabet Wt is part of the protocol design.
At the end of time step T , when no further public com-
munication happens, Eve performs a measurement on her
state ρE, as an attempt to detect the communication and
obtain information about the secret key, while Alice and
Bob use all their available information and randomness to
compute two long binary strings sX and sY , respectively,
as well as the number of bits `X and `Y , respectively, to
use as a secret key. The length of sX and sY is public
and fixed at the beginning of the protocol. Alice finally
sets her key kX to be the first `X bits of sX while Bob
sets his key kY to be the first `Y bits of sY .
A protocol is called an (, δ, µ)-protocol if the following
properties hold. Let W , SX , SY , KX , KY , be the ran-
dom variables representing the total public communica-
tion, Alice’s random string, Bob’s random string, Alice’s
key, and Bob’s key, respectively. We require:
• -reliability: Pe , P
(
KX 6= KY ) 6 , which implicitly
includes the condition `X = `Y ;








is the joint density matrix of the eavesdrop-
per’s observations, public messages and Alice’s random
string, and ρS
X
unif is a mixed state for S
X corresponding
to a uniform distribution;
• µ-covertness: C , D(ρEW ‖ (ρE0 )⊗ ρWunif) 6 µ, where
ρE0 is the density matrix of the eavesdropper’s observa-
tions when no communication takes place and ρWunif is
4a mixed state for W corresponding to a uniform distri-
bution on ×tWt.
A protocol is efficient if it allows key expansion so that
the number of key bits created exceeds the number of
common randomness bits consumed. Our goal is to an-
alyze under what conditions efficient (, µ, δ)-protocols
might exist.
A couple of remarks are in order regarding our pro-
tocol definition. Note that the choice of the key length
is a part of the protocol. However, δ-secrecy requires
the string SX to be secret and not just KX . This is
merely enforced for technical reasons, so that the rela-
tive entropy is a deterministic quantity irrespective of
the length of the key. Since -reliability only applies to
the bits of KX , Alice can always generate the remain-
ing bits of SX independently and uniformly at random
using her local randomness, so that our definition does
not incur any loss of generality. By convention, we as-
sume that the public communication is not by itself a
proof of communication. Instead, µ-covertness only re-
quires that the public bits look uniformly distributed and
do not reveal communication on the quantum channel.
We point out that δ-secrecy and µ-covertness are “one-
shot” guarantees, in the sense that they only ensure a
low probability of detection for a single execution of the
protocol. In fact, by repeating the protocol k consecu-
tive and independent times, a (, δ, µ)-protocol gives rise
to a (k, kδ, kµ)-protocol. Additional post-processing can
reduce the constant k and kδ but cannot affect the con-
stant kµ. This suggests that the protocol should be de-
signed for small values of µ and large values of T . Finally,
the particular choice of the quantum state ρWunif in the
definition of covertness plays no role in our proofs. As
long as there exists a specific state corresponding to no
communication for the public communication, our proof
holds and leads to a covert and secret key generation
scheme.
IV. COVERT AND SECRET KEY
GENERATION OVER KNOWN CQ-CHANNEL
We first address the situation in which the cq-channels
are fixed and known ahead of time, and in which the ad-
versary is passive. In this special case, the length of the
key can be computed ahead of time, and there is no need
to distinguish between the random strings SX and SY
and the keys KX and KY . Furthermore, it becomes pos-
sible to define a notion of covert and secret key capacity
as follows. A throughput Θ is achievable if there exists
a sequence of (T , δT , µT )-protocols generating `T bits of
secret key while consuming rT bits of secret key over T







µT = 0, (5)






The supremum of all achievable throughputs is called the
covert and secret key capacity and denoted Cqck. Note
that the definition of the throughput already captures
the scaling of the throughput with the square root of the
number of channel uses,
√
T . The scaling is justified a
posteriori by our analysis that shows that Cqck is lower
bounded by a constant that only depends on the chan-
nel parameters. The unit of Cqck is therefore in nats per
square root of channel use. Our main results are lower-
bounds on the covert capacity obtained by showing the
existence of sequences of covert secret key generation pro-
tocols using reverse or forward reconciliation.
To analyze the performance of protocols with forward
reconciliation, we build upon existing results for covert
communication over cq-channels [13, 14] with appropri-
ate extensions to guarantee secrecy. The innovative prin-
ciple of our approach is best highlighted for protocols
with reverse reconciliation as follows. In a first phase,
Alice transmits a sequence of independent and identi-
cally distributed (iid) symbols X distributed according to
a Bernoulli(αT ) distribution over the cq-channel, where
αT ∈ ω(( log TT )
2
3 ) ∩ o( 1√
T
). Intuitively, the choice of
{αT }T>1 must ensure that X is sparse, so that the war-
den cannot suspect the existence of information sym-
bols, but not so sparse that Alice and Bob cannot ex-
tract a long enough key from their observation. We shall
show that our choice of {αT }T>1 satisfies simultaneously
both requirements. In a second phase, Bob measures
his received quantum states in some basis and, based on
the output of the measurements, generates two messages
W and K, representing public information reconciliation
and secret key, respectively. Bob subsequently sends W
through the public channel, and Alice recovers K using
W and X. Although the second phase of the protocol
seems deceptively similar to a standard application of in-
formation reconciliation and privacy amplification, there
exists a technical difficulty because of the specific dis-
tributions of Alice’s and Bob’s observations, which pre-
cludes the use of standard tools. More precisely, in the
finite-length analysis resulting from standard information
reconciliation and privacy amplification, penalty terms
appear that depend on the second order statistics of the
conditional information density of Bob and Eve’s obser-
vations given X, which scale as ω(
√
T ); However, the
scaling of the covert throughput is known to be o(
√
T ),
which is dominated by those penalties and therefore pro-
hibits key expansion. We instead resort to a technique
called likelihood encoder [21], in which the encoders used
to generate W and K are derived from different princi-
ples. In particular, instead of information reconciliation
and privacy amplification, we use channel coding and
5X
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<latexit sha1_base64="O8XUDS21dwHovEXGBArqGHi06sI=">AAAB6nicb VBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0hE0GPBS48V7Qe0oWy2m3bpZhN2J0IJ/QlePCji1V/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZemEph0PO+ndLG5tb2Tnm3srd/cHhUPT5pm yTTjLdYIhPdDanhUijeQoGSd1PNaRxK3gknd3O/88S1EYl6xGnKg5iOlIgEo2ilh8bAG1RrnustQNaJX5AaFGgOql/9YcKymCtkkhrT870Ug5xqFEzyWaWfGZ 5SNqEj3rNU0ZibIF+cOiMXVhmSKNG2FJKF+nsip7Ex0zi0nTHFsVn15uJ/Xi/D6DbIhUoz5IotF0WZJJiQ+d9kKDRnKKeWUKaFvZWwMdWUoU2nYkPwV19eJ+ 0r1/dc//66VneLOMpwBudwCT7cQB0a0IQWMBjBM7zCmyOdF+fd+Vi2lpxi5hT+wPn8Abr5jVs=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="O8XUDS21dwHovEXGBArqGHi06sI=">AAAB6nicb VBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0hE0GPBS48V7Qe0oWy2m3bpZhN2J0IJ/QlePCji1V/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZemEph0PO+ndLG5tb2Tnm3srd/cHhUPT5pm yTTjLdYIhPdDanhUijeQoGSd1PNaRxK3gknd3O/88S1EYl6xGnKg5iOlIgEo2ilh8bAG1RrnustQNaJX5AaFGgOql/9YcKymCtkkhrT870Ug5xqFEzyWaWfGZ 5SNqEj3rNU0ZibIF+cOiMXVhmSKNG2FJKF+nsip7Ex0zi0nTHFsVn15uJ/Xi/D6DbIhUoz5IotF0WZJJiQ+d9kKDRnKKeWUKaFvZWwMdWUoU2nYkPwV19eJ+ 0r1/dc//66VneLOMpwBudwCT7cQB0a0IQWMBjBM7zCmyOdF+fd+Vi2lpxi5hT+wPn8Abr5jVs=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="O8XUDS21dwHovEXGBArqGHi06sI=">AAAB6nicb VBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0hE0GPBS48V7Qe0oWy2m3bpZhN2J0IJ/QlePCji1V/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZemEph0PO+ndLG5tb2Tnm3srd/cHhUPT5pm yTTjLdYIhPdDanhUijeQoGSd1PNaRxK3gknd3O/88S1EYl6xGnKg5iOlIgEo2ilh8bAG1RrnustQNaJX5AaFGgOql/9YcKymCtkkhrT870Ug5xqFEzyWaWfGZ 5SNqEj3rNU0ZibIF+cOiMXVhmSKNG2FJKF+nsip7Ex0zi0nTHFsVn15uJ/Xi/D6DbIhUoz5IotF0WZJJiQ+d9kKDRnKKeWUKaFvZWwMdWUoU2nYkPwV19eJ+ 0r1/dc//66VneLOMpwBudwCT7cQB0a0IQWMBjBM7zCmyOdF+fd+Vi2lpxi5hT+wPn8Abr5jVs=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="O8XUDS21dwHovEXGBArqGHi06sI=">AAAB6nicb VBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0hE0GPBS48V7Qe0oWy2m3bpZhN2J0IJ/QlePCji1V/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZemEph0PO+ndLG5tb2Tnm3srd/cHhUPT5pm yTTjLdYIhPdDanhUijeQoGSd1PNaRxK3gknd3O/88S1EYl6xGnKg5iOlIgEo2ilh8bAG1RrnustQNaJX5AaFGgOql/9YcKymCtkkhrT870Ug5xqFEzyWaWfGZ 5SNqEj3rNU0ZibIF+cOiMXVhmSKNG2FJKF+nsip7Ex0zi0nTHFsVn15uJ/Xi/D6DbIhUoz5IotF0WZJJiQ+d9kKDRnKKeWUKaFvZWwMdWUoU2nYkPwV19eJ+ 0r1/dc//66VneLOMpwBudwCT7cQB0a0IQWMBjBM7zCmyOdF+fd+Vi2lpxi5hT+wPn8Abr5jVs=</latexit>
KA KB A, fA  B , fB
public authenticated channel
H1
<latexit sha1_base64="fD3oyw5lPeI+ObDMyuq0voEzC/E=">AAACT3icb VDLThwxEPRswjNAluSYi5VVJC7MA6HAESkcOJLHAtKyWvV4enYt/BjZPYjVaD8hV/JdOeZLcoviHeYQICXZKlW13d2VV0p6StNfUe/Fy5XVtfWNzVdb2zuv+ 7tvLrytncChsMq6qxw8KmlwSJIUXlUOQecKL/ObT0v/8hadl9Z8o3mFYw1TI0spgIL09WySTfqDNE5b8Ock68iAdTif7EYfrwsrao2GhALvR1la0bgBR1IoXG xe1x4rEDcwxVGgBjT6cdPOuuAfglLw0rpwDPFW/fdFA9r7uc5DpQaa+afeUvyfN6qpPB430lQ1oREPjcpacbJ8uTgvpENBah4ICCfDrFzMwIGgEM+jLtyTBj d3RVil/a9Jhj4UJRpnroAiOXW2yu1d8gU9ghOzJFxW7ysgvNtvI3lQJmVtxDJnHwdnEZLOnub6nFwcxFkaZ58PBydxl/k6e8fesz2WsSN2ws7YORsywabsO7t nP6Kf0e/oT68r7UUdecseobfxF3kAs8M=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="fD3oyw5lPeI+ObDMyuq0voEzC/E=">AAACT3icb VDLThwxEPRswjNAluSYi5VVJC7MA6HAESkcOJLHAtKyWvV4enYt/BjZPYjVaD8hV/JdOeZLcoviHeYQICXZKlW13d2VV0p6StNfUe/Fy5XVtfWNzVdb2zuv+ 7tvLrytncChsMq6qxw8KmlwSJIUXlUOQecKL/ObT0v/8hadl9Z8o3mFYw1TI0spgIL09WySTfqDNE5b8Ock68iAdTif7EYfrwsrao2GhALvR1la0bgBR1IoXG xe1x4rEDcwxVGgBjT6cdPOuuAfglLw0rpwDPFW/fdFA9r7uc5DpQaa+afeUvyfN6qpPB430lQ1oREPjcpacbJ8uTgvpENBah4ICCfDrFzMwIGgEM+jLtyTBj d3RVil/a9Jhj4UJRpnroAiOXW2yu1d8gU9ghOzJFxW7ysgvNtvI3lQJmVtxDJnHwdnEZLOnub6nFwcxFkaZ58PBydxl/k6e8fesz2WsSN2ws7YORsywabsO7t nP6Kf0e/oT68r7UUdecseobfxF3kAs8M=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="fD3oyw5lPeI+ObDMyuq0voEzC/E=">AAACT3icb VDLThwxEPRswjNAluSYi5VVJC7MA6HAESkcOJLHAtKyWvV4enYt/BjZPYjVaD8hV/JdOeZLcoviHeYQICXZKlW13d2VV0p6StNfUe/Fy5XVtfWNzVdb2zuv+ 7tvLrytncChsMq6qxw8KmlwSJIUXlUOQecKL/ObT0v/8hadl9Z8o3mFYw1TI0spgIL09WySTfqDNE5b8Ock68iAdTif7EYfrwsrao2GhALvR1la0bgBR1IoXG xe1x4rEDcwxVGgBjT6cdPOuuAfglLw0rpwDPFW/fdFA9r7uc5DpQaa+afeUvyfN6qpPB430lQ1oREPjcpacbJ8uTgvpENBah4ICCfDrFzMwIGgEM+jLtyTBj d3RVil/a9Jhj4UJRpnroAiOXW2yu1d8gU9ghOzJFxW7ysgvNtvI3lQJmVtxDJnHwdnEZLOnub6nFwcxFkaZ58PBydxl/k6e8fesz2WsSN2ws7YORsywabsO7t nP6Kf0e/oT68r7UUdecseobfxF3kAs8M=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="fD3oyw5lPeI+ObDMyuq0voEzC/E=">AAACT3icb VDLThwxEPRswjNAluSYi5VVJC7MA6HAESkcOJLHAtKyWvV4enYt/BjZPYjVaD8hV/JdOeZLcoviHeYQICXZKlW13d2VV0p6StNfUe/Fy5XVtfWNzVdb2zuv+ 7tvLrytncChsMq6qxw8KmlwSJIUXlUOQecKL/ObT0v/8hadl9Z8o3mFYw1TI0spgIL09WySTfqDNE5b8Ock68iAdTif7EYfrwsrao2GhALvR1la0bgBR1IoXG xe1x4rEDcwxVGgBjT6cdPOuuAfglLw0rpwDPFW/fdFA9r7uc5DpQaa+afeUvyfN6qpPB430lQ1oREPjcpacbJ8uTgvpENBah4ICCfDrFzMwIGgEM+jLtyTBj d3RVil/a9Jhj4UJRpnroAiOXW2yu1d8gU9ghOzJFxW7ysgvNtvI3lQJmVtxDJnHwdnEZLOnub6nFwcxFkaZ58PBydxl/k6e8fesz2WsSN2ws7YORsywabsO7t nP6Kf0e/oT68r7UUdecseobfxF3kAs8M=</latexit>
Z
<latexit sha1_base64="6WGq/Z57P AusJPnBpTCuSRj84Oo=">AAACVnicbVDLbtNAFB2blpbySmHJZtSoEpv6gRC wrAQLlgU1bdUkiq7H182o87BmrlEjK3/BFr6L/kzF2MmiryvN6Oic+zxFraS nLLuO4icbm0+3tp/tPH/x8tXrwe6bE28bJ3AkrLLurACPShockSSFZ7VD0IX C0+Lya6ef/kLnpTXHtKhxquHCyEoKoECdTzTQvKja8+VsMMySrA/+EORrMGTr OJrtRp8mpRWNRkNCgffjPKtp2oIjKRQudyaNxxrEJVzgOEADGv207Vde8v3A lLyyLjxDvGdvV7SgvV/oImR2K/r7Wkc+po0bqr5MW2nqhtCI1aCqUZws7+7n pXQoSC0CAOFk2JWLOTgQFFy6M4V70uAWrgyn9P3adORDUqpx7koo02/O1oW9S n+iR3BinobP6gMFhFcHvSUrZlY1RnR2+yQondP5fV8fgpMPSZ4l+Y+Pw8Nk7 fk2e8f22HuWs8/skH1nR2zEBDPsN/vD/kb/opt4M95apcbRuuYtuxPx4D+xg LZS</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6WGq/Z57P AusJPnBpTCuSRj84Oo=">AAACVnicbVDLbtNAFB2blpbySmHJZtSoEpv6gRC wrAQLlgU1bdUkiq7H182o87BmrlEjK3/BFr6L/kzF2MmiryvN6Oic+zxFraS nLLuO4icbm0+3tp/tPH/x8tXrwe6bE28bJ3AkrLLurACPShockSSFZ7VD0IX C0+Lya6ef/kLnpTXHtKhxquHCyEoKoECdTzTQvKja8+VsMMySrA/+EORrMGTr OJrtRp8mpRWNRkNCgffjPKtp2oIjKRQudyaNxxrEJVzgOEADGv207Vde8v3A lLyyLjxDvGdvV7SgvV/oImR2K/r7Wkc+po0bqr5MW2nqhtCI1aCqUZws7+7n pXQoSC0CAOFk2JWLOTgQFFy6M4V70uAWrgyn9P3adORDUqpx7koo02/O1oW9S n+iR3BinobP6gMFhFcHvSUrZlY1RnR2+yQondP5fV8fgpMPSZ4l+Y+Pw8Nk7 fk2e8f22HuWs8/skH1nR2zEBDPsN/vD/kb/opt4M95apcbRuuYtuxPx4D+xg LZS</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6WGq/Z57P AusJPnBpTCuSRj84Oo=">AAACVnicbVDLbtNAFB2blpbySmHJZtSoEpv6gRC wrAQLlgU1bdUkiq7H182o87BmrlEjK3/BFr6L/kzF2MmiryvN6Oic+zxFraS nLLuO4icbm0+3tp/tPH/x8tXrwe6bE28bJ3AkrLLurACPShockSSFZ7VD0IX C0+Lya6ef/kLnpTXHtKhxquHCyEoKoECdTzTQvKja8+VsMMySrA/+EORrMGTr OJrtRp8mpRWNRkNCgffjPKtp2oIjKRQudyaNxxrEJVzgOEADGv207Vde8v3A lLyyLjxDvGdvV7SgvV/oImR2K/r7Wkc+po0bqr5MW2nqhtCI1aCqUZws7+7n pXQoSC0CAOFk2JWLOTgQFFy6M4V70uAWrgyn9P3adORDUqpx7koo02/O1oW9S n+iR3BinobP6gMFhFcHvSUrZlY1RnR2+yQondP5fV8fgpMPSZ4l+Y+Pw8Nk7 fk2e8f22HuWs8/skH1nR2zEBDPsN/vD/kb/opt4M95apcbRuuYtuxPx4D+xg LZS</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6WGq/Z57P AusJPnBpTCuSRj84Oo=">AAACVnicbVDLbtNAFB2blpbySmHJZtSoEpv6gRC wrAQLlgU1bdUkiq7H182o87BmrlEjK3/BFr6L/kzF2MmiryvN6Oic+zxFraS nLLuO4icbm0+3tp/tPH/x8tXrwe6bE28bJ3AkrLLurACPShockSSFZ7VD0IX C0+Lya6ef/kLnpTXHtKhxquHCyEoKoECdTzTQvKja8+VsMMySrA/+EORrMGTr OJrtRp8mpRWNRkNCgffjPKtp2oIjKRQudyaNxxrEJVzgOEADGv207Vde8v3A lLyyLjxDvGdvV7SgvV/oImR2K/r7Wkc+po0bqr5MW2nqhtCI1aCqUZws7+7n pXQoSC0CAOFk2JWLOTgQFFy6M4V70uAWrgyn9P3adORDUqpx7koo02/O1oW9S n+iR3BinobP6gMFhFcHvSUrZlY1RnR2+yQondP5fV8fgpMPSZ4l+Y+Pw8Nk7 fk2e8f22HuWs8/skH1nR2zEBDPsN/vD/kb/opt4M95apcbRuuYtuxPx4D+xg LZS</latexit>
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<latexit sha1_ba se64="Y1d3qyeyAIFVhqSgm/DiWE/3 XpA=">AAACcnicbVFLbhQxEPU0vzB8 MoEdbAwDEgvSH4SAZSRYsAyISSJNj0 bV7uppK/607GqUUTMX4DRs4SbcgwPg 6fSCJJRk6+m9KpfrVdEo6SlNf4+ia9 dv3Ly1c3t85+69+7uTvQdH3rZO4ExY Zd1JAR6VNDgjSQpPGoegC4XHxen7rX7 8FZ2X1nyhdYMLDSsjKymAArWcPEtzs vxbmjswK4V5Ps56IgfV1DCwy8k0jdM ++FWQDWDKhjhc7o3e5KUVrUZDQoH38 yxtaNGBIykUbsZ567EBcQornAdoQKN fdP04G/48MCWvrAvHEO/Zfys60N6vd REyNVDtL2tb8n/avKXq3aKTpmkJjTh vVLWKh4G33vBSOhSk1gGAcDL8lYsaHA gKDl7owj1pcGtXhlH697pk5kNSorF2 JZTJB2ebwp4ln9EjOFEn4bJ6XwHh2X 5vyTmzrFojtqvwcVA2wenssq9XwdGr OEvj7NPr6UE8eL7DHrOn7AXL2Ft2wD 6yQzZjgn1nP9hP9mv0J3oUPYmGBUWj oeYhuxDRy7/IEL99</latexit><latexit sha1_ba se64="Y1d3qyeyAIFVhqSgm/DiWE/3 XpA=">AAACcnicbVFLbhQxEPU0vzB8 MoEdbAwDEgvSH4SAZSRYsAyISSJNj0 bV7uppK/607GqUUTMX4DRs4SbcgwPg 6fSCJJRk6+m9KpfrVdEo6SlNf4+ia9 dv3Ly1c3t85+69+7uTvQdH3rZO4ExY Zd1JAR6VNDgjSQpPGoegC4XHxen7rX7 8FZ2X1nyhdYMLDSsjKymAArWcPEtzs vxbmjswK4V5Ps56IgfV1DCwy8k0jdM ++FWQDWDKhjhc7o3e5KUVrUZDQoH38 yxtaNGBIykUbsZ567EBcQornAdoQKN fdP04G/48MCWvrAvHEO/Zfys60N6vd REyNVDtL2tb8n/avKXq3aKTpmkJjTh vVLWKh4G33vBSOhSk1gGAcDL8lYsaHA gKDl7owj1pcGtXhlH697pk5kNSorF2 JZTJB2ebwp4ln9EjOFEn4bJ6XwHh2X 5vyTmzrFojtqvwcVA2wenssq9XwdGr OEvj7NPr6UE8eL7DHrOn7AXL2Ft2wD 6yQzZjgn1nP9hP9mv0J3oUPYmGBUWj oeYhuxDRy7/IEL99</latexit><latexit sha1_ba se64="Y1d3qyeyAIFVhqSgm/DiWE/3 XpA=">AAACcnicbVFLbhQxEPU0vzB8 MoEdbAwDEgvSH4SAZSRYsAyISSJNj0 bV7uppK/607GqUUTMX4DRs4SbcgwPg 6fSCJJRk6+m9KpfrVdEo6SlNf4+ia9 dv3Ly1c3t85+69+7uTvQdH3rZO4ExY Zd1JAR6VNDgjSQpPGoegC4XHxen7rX7 8FZ2X1nyhdYMLDSsjKymAArWcPEtzs vxbmjswK4V5Ps56IgfV1DCwy8k0jdM ++FWQDWDKhjhc7o3e5KUVrUZDQoH38 yxtaNGBIykUbsZ567EBcQornAdoQKN fdP04G/48MCWvrAvHEO/Zfys60N6vd REyNVDtL2tb8n/avKXq3aKTpmkJjTh vVLWKh4G33vBSOhSk1gGAcDL8lYsaHA gKDl7owj1pcGtXhlH697pk5kNSorF2 JZTJB2ebwp4ln9EjOFEn4bJ6XwHh2X 5vyTmzrFojtqvwcVA2wenssq9XwdGr OEvj7NPr6UE8eL7DHrOn7AXL2Ft2wD 6yQzZjgn1nP9hP9mv0J3oUPYmGBUWj oeYhuxDRy7/IEL99</latexit><latexit sha1_ba se64="Y1d3qyeyAIFVhqSgm/DiWE/3 XpA=">AAACcnicbVFLbhQxEPU0vzB8 MoEdbAwDEgvSH4SAZSRYsAyISSJNj0 bV7uppK/607GqUUTMX4DRs4SbcgwPg 6fSCJJRk6+m9KpfrVdEo6SlNf4+ia9 dv3Ly1c3t85+69+7uTvQdH3rZO4ExY Zd1JAR6VNDgjSQpPGoegC4XHxen7rX7 8FZ2X1nyhdYMLDSsjKymAArWcPEtzs vxbmjswK4V5Ps56IgfV1DCwy8k0jdM ++FWQDWDKhjhc7o3e5KUVrUZDQoH38 yxtaNGBIykUbsZ567EBcQornAdoQKN fdP04G/48MCWvrAvHEO/Zfys60N6vd REyNVDtL2tb8n/avKXq3aKTpmkJjTh vVLWKh4G33vBSOhSk1gGAcDL8lYsaHA gKDl7owj1pcGtXhlH697pk5kNSorF2 JZTJB2ebwp4ln9EjOFEn4bJ6XwHh2X 5vyTmzrFojtqvwcVA2wenssq9XwdGr OEvj7NPr6UE8eL7DHrOn7AXL2Ft2wD 6yQzZjgn1nP9hP9mv0J3oUPYmGBUWj oeYhuxDRy7/IEL99</latexit>
W
<latexit sha1_base64="OHsfffMPG og1vgpvOPJ7aqhDbc8=">AAACTXicbVDLShxBFK0e4zPRqFm6KTIEsrEfIUS XQlxkqeI4wjgMt6tvO4X1aKpui0MzX+A2flfW+ZDsQkhNzyx8XajicM59nrx S0lOa/o46S2+WV1bX1jfevtvcer+9s3vhbe0E9oRV1l3m4FFJgz2SpPCycgg 6V9jPb77P9P4tOi+tOadJhUMN10aWUgAF6rQ/2u6mcdoGfwmyBeiyRZyMdqJv V4UVtUZDQoH3gyytaNiAIykUTjeuao8ViBu4xkGABjT6YdNuOuWfAlPw0rrw DPGWfVzRgPZ+ovOQqYHG/rk2I1/TBjWVh8NGmqomNGI+qKwVJ8tnZ/NCOhSk JgGAcDLsysUYHAgK5jyZwj1pcBNXhFPafk3S8yEp0Th2BRTJsbNVbu+SM/QIT oyT8Fm9r4Dwbr+1ZM6MytqImcs+Dso0OJ099/UluPgSZ2mcnX7tHsULz9fYH vvIPrOMHbAj9oOdsB4TDNk9+8keol/Rn+hv9G+e2okWNR/Yk+is/gdX47Qt< /latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OHsfffMPG og1vgpvOPJ7aqhDbc8=">AAACTXicbVDLShxBFK0e4zPRqFm6KTIEsrEfIUS XQlxkqeI4wjgMt6tvO4X1aKpui0MzX+A2flfW+ZDsQkhNzyx8XajicM59nrx S0lOa/o46S2+WV1bX1jfevtvcer+9s3vhbe0E9oRV1l3m4FFJgz2SpPCycgg 6V9jPb77P9P4tOi+tOadJhUMN10aWUgAF6rQ/2u6mcdoGfwmyBeiyRZyMdqJv V4UVtUZDQoH3gyytaNiAIykUTjeuao8ViBu4xkGABjT6YdNuOuWfAlPw0rrw DPGWfVzRgPZ+ovOQqYHG/rk2I1/TBjWVh8NGmqomNGI+qKwVJ8tnZ/NCOhSk JgGAcDLsysUYHAgK5jyZwj1pcBNXhFPafk3S8yEp0Th2BRTJsbNVbu+SM/QIT oyT8Fm9r4Dwbr+1ZM6MytqImcs+Dso0OJ099/UluPgSZ2mcnX7tHsULz9fYH vvIPrOMHbAj9oOdsB4TDNk9+8keol/Rn+hv9G+e2okWNR/Yk+is/gdX47Qt< /latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OHsfffMPG og1vgpvOPJ7aqhDbc8=">AAACTXicbVDLShxBFK0e4zPRqFm6KTIEsrEfIUS XQlxkqeI4wjgMt6tvO4X1aKpui0MzX+A2flfW+ZDsQkhNzyx8XajicM59nrx S0lOa/o46S2+WV1bX1jfevtvcer+9s3vhbe0E9oRV1l3m4FFJgz2SpPCycgg 6V9jPb77P9P4tOi+tOadJhUMN10aWUgAF6rQ/2u6mcdoGfwmyBeiyRZyMdqJv V4UVtUZDQoH3gyytaNiAIykUTjeuao8ViBu4xkGABjT6YdNuOuWfAlPw0rrw DPGWfVzRgPZ+ovOQqYHG/rk2I1/TBjWVh8NGmqomNGI+qKwVJ8tnZ/NCOhSk JgGAcDLsysUYHAgK5jyZwj1pcBNXhFPafk3S8yEp0Th2BRTJsbNVbu+SM/QIT oyT8Fm9r4Dwbr+1ZM6MytqImcs+Dso0OJ099/UluPgSZ2mcnX7tHsULz9fYH vvIPrOMHbAj9oOdsB4TDNk9+8keol/Rn+hv9G+e2okWNR/Yk+is/gdX47Qt< /latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OHsfffMPG og1vgpvOPJ7aqhDbc8=">AAACTXicbVDLShxBFK0e4zPRqFm6KTIEsrEfIUS XQlxkqeI4wjgMt6tvO4X1aKpui0MzX+A2flfW+ZDsQkhNzyx8XajicM59nrx S0lOa/o46S2+WV1bX1jfevtvcer+9s3vhbe0E9oRV1l3m4FFJgz2SpPCycgg 6V9jPb77P9P4tOi+tOadJhUMN10aWUgAF6rQ/2u6mcdoGfwmyBeiyRZyMdqJv V4UVtUZDQoH3gyytaNiAIykUTjeuao8ViBu4xkGABjT6YdNuOuWfAlPw0rrw DPGWfVzRgPZ+ovOQqYHG/rk2I1/TBjWVh8NGmqomNGI+qKwVJ8tnZ/NCOhSk JgGAcDLsysUYHAgK5jyZwj1pcBNXhFPafk3S8yEp0Th2BRTJsbNVbu+SM/QIT oyT8Fm9r4Dwbr+1ZM6MytqImcs+Dso0OJ099/UluPgSZ2mcnX7tHsULz9fYH vvIPrOMHbAj9oOdsB4TDNk9+8keol/Rn+hv9G+e2okWNR/Yk+is/gdX47Qt< /latexit>
Figure 2. Simplified model of a lossy bosonic channel.
channel resolvability to only analyze quantities depend-
ing on mutual information, which has the same scaling
as the number of bits generated by a covert protocol.
The analysis of protocols with forward and reverse rec-
onciliation leads to Theorem 1 below, which proof is given
in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. Let {|y〉B} be any orthonor-
mal basis for HB, and define ρ˜BEx ,∑
y
(|y〉〈y|B ⊗ IE) ρBEx (|y〉〈y|B ⊗ IE). Assume that HB












) (D(ρ˜B1 ‖ρ˜B0 )− D(ρ˜E1 ‖ρ˜E0 )) , (8)
and if ρ˜BE0 = ρ˜
B







) (D(ρ˜BE1 ‖ρ˜BE0 )− D(ρ˜E1 ‖ρ˜E0 )
−D(ρ˜BE1 ‖ρ˜B1 ⊗ ρ˜E1 )) , (9)
which simplifies when ρ˜BE1 = ρ˜
B







)D(ρ˜B1 ‖ρ˜B0 ). (10)
While this result certainly does not hold for the most
general quantum setting, note that the covert secret key
throughputs predicted hold with a precise definition of
covertness that explicitly includes the public communica-
tion and demonstrate the existence of efficient protocols
that allow key expansion. Perhaps more importantly, as
apparent in the proof of the result, such protocols do not
rely on a secret key to determine the instances in which
Alice transmits non-zero states; in contrast, our proof
shows the existence of reconciliation and key-extraction
algorithms capable of extracting the diffuse secret cor-
relations created by Alice’s sparse transmission of non-
innocent states.
As an illustration, we consider the situation depicted in
Fig. 2 in which the input port of a balanced beam-splitter
is in control of Alice while Bob and Eve are each con-
nected to one of the output ports through optical fibers
of length dAB and dAE , respectively, and loss γ dB/km.
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Forward reconciliation for |α|2 =0.001
Forward reconciliation for |α|2 =0.0015
Reverse reconciliation for |α|2 =0.001
Reverse reconciliation for |α|2 =0.0015
Figure 3. Covert and secret key generation throughput as a
function of Eve’s dark count rate.
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Figure 4. Covert and secret key generation throughput for a
lossy bosonic channel.
We further assume that the second input port is in the
vacuum state, and that Alice uses the vacuum state |0〉
and a coherent state |α〉 as the innocent and the infor-
mation symbol, respectively. Bob and Eve measure their
output ports with photodetectors to count the number of
photons at each channel use. The photodetectors suffer
from dark count that is beneficial for covert communi-
cation since detection of photons at Eve does not neces-
sarily imply the existence communication. Let ηB and
ηE be Bob and Eve’s photodetector efficiency, respec-
tively, and λB and λE be Bob and Eve’s photodetector
dark count rate, respectively. The achievable covert and


































in (8) and (10) for forward and reverse reconciliation, re-
spectively. Note that the output states of this channel
belong to infinite-dimensional spaces and, strictly speak-
ing, one cannot directly apply Theorem 1. Nevertheless,
since for the number states {|n〉}n>0, 〈n|ρ|n〉 decays ex-
ponentially for all output states ρ, one can construct a se-
quence of channels with finite-dimensional output states
for which the quantities used in (8) and (10), as well as
the performance of any covert and secret key generation
protocol, tend to those of the original channel.
We illustrate in Fig. 3 the achievable covert and se-
cret key throughput as a function of Eve’s photodetector
dark count rate λE for γ = 0.2 dB/km, ηB = ηE = 0.97,
λB = 0.001, and dAB = dAE = 3 km. In Fig. 4, we also
illustrate the achievable covert and secret key through-
put as a function of the distance of Bob to Alice dAB
for |α|2 = 0.001, γ = 0.2 dB/km, ηB = ηE = 0.97,
λB = λE = 0.001, and dAE = 3 km. As expected, the se-
cret and covert key throughputs are orders of magnitude
lower than their counterparts without covertness con-
straint. This is an unfortunate but unavoidable byprod-
uct of the covertness constraint, which severely limits
how many useful bits can be embedded in transmitted
signals.
V. COVERT AND SECRET KEY GENERATION
OVER UNKNOWN CQ-CHANNEL
We now relax the assumption that Alice and Bob have
full-knowledge of the communication channel. To this
end, we assume that to transmit “0” and “1”, Alice pre-
pares two states ρA˜0 and ρ
A˜
1 , respectively, and sends these
states to Bob through an unknown but fixed quantum
channel EA˜→B . We know that Eve’s information about
the communication is limited to the output of the com-
plementary channel of EA˜→B denoted by EA˜→E , E†A˜→B
[20]. In this setting, we define two cq-channels from
Alice to Bob and Eve as x 7→ ρBx , EA˜→B(ρA˜x ) and
x 7→ ρEx , EA˜→E(ρA˜x ). To communicate covertly in this
scenario, we propose a protocol consisting of two phases:
in the first phase, Alice and Bob covertly perform quan-
tum tomography to derive bounds on the required pa-
rameters of the channels, and in the second phase, af-
ter the class of possible channels is sufficiently narrowed
down, Alice and Bob run a universal covert code, the use
of which is critical since there would always be an error
in the estimation phase. More precisely, by the central
limit theorem, with high probability, the estimation er-
ror would be Ω( 1√
T
) when the estimation is taking place
over O(T ) channel uses. Thus, if a protocol is guaranteed
to sustain a certain performance for only the estimated
channel, the estimation error could potentially lead to a
significant deviation in the predicted performance when
the protocol is executed over T uses of the true channel.
Before stating the main result of this section, we re-
call the definition of the χ representation of a quantum
channel from [22]. If |1〉, · · · , |d〉 is an orthonormal basis
for HB , we let E˜d(n−1)+m , |n〉〈m| so that E˜1, · · · , E˜d2
forms an orthonormal basis for L(H). By [22], there ex-







The matrix χ is defined as the matrix with entries χj,k.
The following then holds.
Theorem 2. Let λ˜χ, λ˜B and λ˜E be fixed in ]0, 1]. Let














There exists a vanishing sequence {T }T>1 and a se-
quence of (T , T , µT ) covert and secret key generation
protocols such that for all quantum channels EA˜→B with
λmin(EA˜→E(ρA˜0 )) > λ˜E , (18)
we have




Additionally, if Eq. (18) holds as well as
λmin(χ) > λ˜χ, (20)
λmin(EA˜→B(ρA˜0 )) > λ˜B , (21)
then with probability at least 1 − T , the length of the










Theorem 2 has a slightly more complicated form than
Theorem 1 because of the statistical uncertainty associ-
ated to the estimation phase. Nevertheless, the inter-
pretation remains intuitive and as follows. Firstly, the
parameter αT defined in (17) controls the fraction of sym-
bols “1” transmitted over T channel uses, and should be























Figure 5. Quantum relative entropy of main and warden chan-
nels
understood as close to but slightly less than 1/
√
T . For
this choice, the covertness parameter µT vanishes with
T while the number of secret key bits covertly generated
scales almost as Ω(
√
T ). Secondly, the condition (18)
states that the channel to the adversary should be noisy
enough to allow covert operation a priori. This condition
should not be surprising, as we know that covert com-
munication is impossible in a general setting [12]. The
conditions (20) and (21) are technical conditions to avoid
extreme cases, which are necessary to ascertain the reli-
ability of our estimation protocol and can be set to the
technological limits of Eve’s apparatus. As apparent in
the proof, these three conditions only affect the sequence
{T }T>1 but not the asymptotic covert and secret key
rate guaranteed in (22). Finally, Alice and Bob can test
whether λmin(EA˜→E(ρA˜0 )) > λ˜E with high probability at
the end the phase and abort the protocol if the condition
is violated. In that case, we cannot guarantee the covert-
ness constraint as we have sent too many non-innocent
symbols in the estimation phase but we may still avoid
detection by aborting the key-generation phase of the
protocol.
We illustrate the result of Theorem 2 for a specific
quantum channel, EA˜→B , from Alice to Bob. We assume
that EA˜→B is a phase flip channel with flipping probabil-
ity p, namely, EA˜→B(ρA˜) = (1 − p)ρ + pσzρσz, and the



























for different values of p. By Theorem 2, the




) − D(ρE1 ‖ρE0 ))αTT , which scales as
O(αTT ) except for p = 0.5.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
We prove Theorem 1 by generalizing the proof of [23,
Theorem 1] to the quantum setting. The most challeng-
ing part of this generalization is to establish a channel
resolvability result for cq-channels for distributions suit-
able for covert communications. We first introduce some
preliminary concepts regarding covert communications
mostly borrowed from [11]. We also note that the use
of standard proof techniques for secret key generation
such as source coding with side information and privacy
amplification is challenging for covert communication as
discussed in Section IV. We therefore resort to the like-
lihood encoder technique [21] in which we first define an
auxiliary problem that can be analyzed using channel
coding approaches, for which designing a code for the
main problem is reduced to the design of code for the
auxiliary problem.
1. Preliminaries
We define here required quantities used for our achiev-
ability proof. Suppose Alice sends iid symbols through
her cq-channel x 7→ ρBEx with each symbol distributed
according to QX ∼ Bernoulli(αT ) for αT ∈ (0, 1). Upon
receiving each state, Bob makes a measurement in a fixed
orthonormal basis {|y〉B} for HB to obtain a classical
symbol y. In the following, we define equivalent cq-
channels from Bob to Alice and Eve that results in to
the same joint state for the three parties.























QX(x)|x〉〈x|A ⊗ ρ˜BEx , (A3)
ρ˜Ex,y ,
trB






QX|Y (x|y)|x〉〈x|A ⊗ ρ˜Ex,y. (A5)
8Note that the state ρ˜ABE is the joint state of all parties
after Bob’s measurement, which is classical for both Alice
and Bob, and ρ˜BEx , ρ˜
AE
y , and ρ˜
E
x,y are the corresponding
conditional quantum states.
The following lemma establishes useful properties of




0 ⊗ ρ˜E0 .
Lemma 1. If ρ˜BE0 = ρ˜
B
0 ⊗ ρ˜E0 then, for all y, it holds
that ρ˜E0,y = ρ˜
E
0 . Furthermore, we have
I(QY , ρ˜
E
















ρ˜BE1 ‖ρ˜B1 ⊗ ρ˜E1
))
+O(α2T ). (A6)
Proof. By the spectral decomposition theorem, there ex-













λyy′zz′ |y〉〈y′|B ⊗ |z〉〈z′|E . (A9)
Our assumption that ρ˜BE0 = ρ˜
B
0 ⊗ ρ˜E0 implies that
λyy′zz′ = λyλz1{y = y′, z = z′}. Furthermore, for any
y, we have by definition
ρ˜E0,y ,
trB









λy′λz′ |y′〉〈y′|B ⊗ |z′〉〈z′|E



























= 1, which to-
gether with (A14) yields ρ˜E0 = ρ˜
E
0,y.





= I(A;B)ρ˜ + I(A;E)ρ˜ − I(A;BE)ρ˜ + I(B;E|A)ρ˜.
(A15)
Moreover, for ρ˜BαT , (1− αT )ρ˜B0 + αT ρ˜B1 , we can write
I(A;B)ρ˜ (A16)




)− (1− αT )ρ˜B0 log(ρ˜B0 )






)− log (ρ˜B0 )+ log (ρ˜B0 ))
− (1− αT )ρ˜B0 log(ρ˜B0 )− αT ρ˜B1 log(ρ˜B1 )) (A19)
= −tr(ρ˜BαT
(





























Since X is classical, [20, Equation (11.92)] yields that
I(B;E|A)ρ˜ = (1− αT )I(B;E)ρ˜0 + αT I(B;E)ρ˜1 (A25)
(a)
= αT I(B;E)ρ˜1 (A26)
= αTD
(
ρ˜BE1 ‖ρ˜B1 ⊗ ρ˜E1
)
, (A27)
where (a) follows from our assumption that ρ˜BE0 = ρ˜
B
0 ⊗
ρ˜E0 . This completes the proof of (A6).
2. One-shot results
We recall here one-shot results for classical channel
coding and classical channel resolvability (Lemma 2) and
quantum channel resolvability (Lemma 3) that play a
central role on our analysis. Given a classical chan-
nel (X ,WY |X ,Y), a message W uniformly distributed
over J1,MK, and an encoder f : J1,MK → X , let
P̂WXY (w, x, y) , 1M 1{f(w) = x}WY |X(y|x) be the in-
duced Probability Mass Function (PMF) of W , X, and
Y , and Ŵ , arg maxw∈J1,MKWY |X(Y |f(w)) be the max-
imum likelihood decoder at the output.
Lemma 2 (One-shot Bounds). If F is a random encoder
such that {F (w)}w∈J1,MK are iid according to a distribu-





































where (WY |X ◦ PX)(y) ,
∑
x PX(x)WY |X(y|x).
Proof. See [24] for (A28) and [25] for (A29).
Let y 7→ ρy denote a cq-channel and PY be a PMF
over Y. If ρ , ∑y PY (y)ρy, our objective is to find an
encoder f : J1,MK → Y such that ‖ρ − ρ̂‖1 be small,
where ρ̂ , 1M
∑M
i=1 ρf(i).
Lemma 3. If F : J1,MK→ Y is a random encoder whose
codewords are iid according to PY , then for all s 6 0 and
γ, we have














and ν is the
number of distinct eigenvalues of ρ.
Proof. See [26, Lemma 9.2].
3. An auxiliary problem
To show the existence of good codes for our main prob-
lem, we use the likelihood encoder technique [21], and
in particular, define an auxiliary problem for which we
can exploit channel coding instead of source coding. We
then show how these two problems are related in Sec-
tion A 4. Consider a cq-channel y 7→ ρ˜AEy from Bob to
Alice and Eve as in Definition 1. Bob encodes three uni-
formly distributed messages W1 ∈ J1,M1K, W2 ∈ J1,M2K,
and W3 ∈ J1,M3K into a codeword Y using an encoder
f : J1,M1K × J1,M2K × J1,M3K → YT , transmits the
codeword Y over the cq-channel, and sends W2 pub-
licly. Alice subsequently performs a measurement on
her received state ρAY in a fixed basis {|x〉} to obtain
X, and uses X and W2 to decode W1 as Ŵ1. If P
a
Y
denotes the induced PMF of Y, and ρABEW1W2W3Ŵ1a
is the joint state in the auxiliary problem, our objec-











‖ρEW1W2 − ρE ⊗ ρW1W2‖1 are small.
Lemma 4. If for some ζ > 0
logM3 = b(1 + ζ)I(QY , ρ˜Ey )T c,
(A31)
logM1 + logM2 + logM3 = d(1 + ζ)H(QY )T e, (A32)
logM1 + logM3 = b(1− ζ)I(QY , QX|Y )T c,
(A33)
(A34)
then there exists a sequence of codes and a positive con-












6 2−ξT , (A36)
‖ρEW1W2 − ρE ⊗ ρW1W2‖1 6 2−ω(log T ). (A37)
Proof. Let F : J1,M1K × J1,M2K × J1,M3K be a ran-
dom encoder whose codewords are drawn independently
according to Q⊗TY . By construction, Alice can assume
that each symbol Xi is received as the output of a DMC















































where (a) follows from applying Lemma 2 to the sub-
codebook {F (w1, w2, w3) : w1 ∈ J1,M1K, w3 ∈ J1,M3K}
for a particular w2. By choosing






I(QX , QY |X)T, (A40)




























for some ξ > 0. Next, by using Lemma 2 for the chan-
nel (Y, QY ′|Y ,Y) with QY ′|Y (y′|y) , 1{y′ = y} and the

































and using Hoeffding’s inequality [28], with µY ,

























for ξ > 0 small enough.






|w1w2〉〈w1w2| ⊗ ρEw1w2 , (A46)
to upper-bound EF
(‖ρEW1W2 − ρE ⊗ ρW1W2‖1), we ap-
ply Lemma 3 and obtain
EF
(





































logM3 = bI(QY , ρ˜Ey )T + ζαTT c, (A49)


































































where (a) follows from [26, Lemma 3.7]. We now intro-
duce the following technical lemma to simplify the above
expression.
Lemma 5. Suppose s < 0; there exists a constant B > 0
such that for T large enough and |s| small enough, we
have
φ(s) > −I(QY , ρ˜Ey )s−B(αT s2 − s3). (A52)
Proof. See Appendix C.



































By choosing s = o(
√
αT )∩ω( log TTαT )[29], the above expres-
sion goes to zero faster than any polynomial. Therefore,



















‖ρW1W2E − (ρ˜E)⊗T ⊗ ρW1W2‖1) 6 2−ω(log T ),
(A56)
if
logM3 = b(1 + ζ)I(QY , ρ˜Ey )T c,
(A57)
logM1 + logM2 + logM3 = d(1 + ζ)H(QY )T e, (A58)
logM1 + logM3 = b(1− ζ)I(QY , QX|Y )T c.
(A59)












6 4× 2−ξT }, (A61)
E3 , {‖ρW1W2E −
(
ρ˜E
)⊗T ⊗ ρW1W2‖1 6 4× 2−ω(log T )},
(A62)
and using Markov inequality, we have
PF (E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3)





















‖ρW1W2E − (ρ˜E)⊗T ⊗ ρW1W2‖1)


















6 4× 2−ξT , (A65)
‖ρW1W2E − (ρ˜E)⊗T ⊗ ρW1W2‖1 6 4× 2−ω(log T ). (A66)
4. Proof of Theorem 1








) (D(ρ˜BE1 ‖ρ˜BE0 )
− D(ρ˜E1 ‖ρ˜E0 )− D(ρ˜BE1 ‖ρ˜B1 ⊗ ρ˜E1 )). (A67)
Consider a specific code for the auxiliary problem and let
ρ˜ABEW1W2Ŵ1 be the corresponding induced joint quan-
tum state. Because all random variables W1, W2, X, and
Y are classical, we can define their induced joint PMF de-
noted by P˜W1W2XY. We then use the conditional PMFs
P˜W1W2|Y and P˜Ŵ1|XW2 as the encoder and decoder, re-
spectively, in the main problem resulting in the induced
joint quantum state ρ̂ABEW1W2W3Ŵ1 . By our construc-






× P˜W1W2|Y(w1, w2|y)Q⊗TX|Y (x|y)P˜Ŵ1|XW2(ŵ1|x, w2)






× P˜W1W2|Y(w1, w2|y)Q⊗TX|Y (x|y)P˜Ŵ1|XW2(ŵ1|x, w2)
× |yxw1w2ŵ1〉〈yxw1w2ŵ1| ⊗ ρ˜Ex,y. (A69)








6 2−ξT , (A70)
where (a) follows from (A55). Thus, we upper-bound the
probability of error in the main problem as
PP̂ (W1 6= W2)
6 PP˜ (W1 6= W2)
+ ‖ρ˜ABEW1W2W3Ŵ1 − ρ̂ABEW1W2W3Ŵ1‖1
6 2−ζαTT + 2−ζT ,
(A71)
and upper-bound the sum of secrecy and covertness as




























1 ‖ρE0 )T +O(α3TT ) (A74)
(b)












1 ‖ρE0 )T +O(α3TT ) (A75)
= ‖ρ̂W1W2E − ρW1W2unif ⊗ ρ̂E‖1
×
(



















1 ‖ρE0 )T +O(α3TT ), (A77)
where (a) follows from [14, Lemma 7], (b) follows from
Lemma 23, and (c) follows from
‖ρ̂W1W2E − ρW1W2unif ⊗ ρ̂E‖1
6 ‖ρ˜W1W2E − ρW1W2unif ⊗ ρ̂E‖1 + ‖ρ̂W1W2E − ρ˜W1W2E‖1
6 2−ζαTT + 2−ζT .
(A78)
The throughput of the coding scheme is lower-bounded

















b(1− ζ)I(A;B)ρ˜T c − dI(B;E)ρ˜T + ζαTT e








) (D(ρ˜BE1 ‖ρ˜BE0 )− D(ρ˜E1 ‖ρ˜E0 )− D(ρ˜BE1 ‖ρ˜B1 ⊗ ρ˜E1 ))+ o(1). (A81)







) (D(ρ˜B1 ‖ρ˜B0 )− D(ρ˜E1 ‖ρ˜E0 )) .
(A82)








, the result is trivial.









Let M1 and M2 be such that
logM1 + logM2 = b(1− ζ)I(QX , ρ˜By )c, (A83)
logM2 = d(1 + ζ)I(QX , ρ˜Ey )e. (A84)
The protocol is then as follows. Alice chooses a random
binary string of length logM1+logM2 and transmits this
string through a covert code introduced in [14]. Alice
and Bob subsequently extract the first logM1 bits of the
string as the key. The reliability and covertness proof






















Similar to the proof of (A56), one can show that the
above expression is upper-bounded by 2−ω(log T ) provided
that logM2 = d(1 + ζ)I(QX , ρ˜Ey )e. Lower-bounding the
throughput as in (A81) using (A83) and (A84) concludes
the proof.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2
1. Universal covert communication














is required to covertly generate a secret key.
Theorem 3. Let DB, DE, λ˜B, and λ˜E be fixed numbers
and {αT }T>1 be as in Definition 1. For any ζ > 0, there
exists a sequence of codes {CT }T>1 such that for all cq-










6 DE , (B2)
λmin(ρ
B
0 ) > λ˜B , (B3)
λmin(ρ
E
0 ) > λ˜E , (B4)
we have
Pe 6 2T−5, (B5)

















logM = (1− 2ζ)(DB −DE)αTT, (B8)
where L1, L2 > 0 depend on the dimHE and λ˜E.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to the proof
of the above result. We first adapt a result from [30],
which shows that for any class of cq-channels, there exists
a finite class of cq-channels that approximates the main
class with high precision.
Lemma 6. Consider a compound cq-channel x 7→ ρBx (θ)
where x ∈ X , ρBx ∈ D(H), H is a d-dimensional Hilbert
space, and θ ∈ Θ is an arbitrary index set. There exists a
constant K > 0 that depends only on d such that for all
T ∈ N, there exists another compound cq-channel x 7→
ρBx (θ˜) with x ∈ X , ρBx ∈ D(H), and θ˜ ∈ Θ˜ such that
1. the set Θ˜ is finite, i.e.,
|Θ˜| 6 K |X |T 6|X |d2 ; (B9)
2. for all θ ∈ Θ, there exists a θ˜ ∈ Θ˜ such that for all
x ∈ X T , we have
‖ρBx (θ)− ρBx (θ˜)‖1 6 T−5; (B10)
















Proof. We modify the proof provided in [30] to derive a
tighter upper-bound on the approximation error of the
new compound channel at the expense of increasing its
size. By [30, Theorem 5.5], for all κ > 0, there exists a
partition of all cq-channels from X to D(H) denoted by
Π = {pi1, · · · , pin} such that n 6 K |X |κ−|X|d2 , where K
only depends on the dimension of H, d, and the diameter
of Π is at most κ, i.e., for all i ∈ J1, nK, for any two chan-
nels x 7→ ρBx and x 7→ ρ˜Bx in pii, for any x ∈ X , we have
‖ρBx − ρ˜Bx ‖1 6 κ. Setting κ = T−6, this implies that there
exists a partition of size at most K |X |T 6|X |d
2
and diam-
eter at most T−6. We construct the new compound cq-
channel x 7→ ρBx (θ˜) by selecting an arbitrary channel from
each pii whose intersection with {x 7→ ρBx (θ) : θ ∈ Θ} is
non-empty. We now show that this compound channel
satisfies the conditions mentioned in the statement of the
lemma. Since we select at most one channel from each pii,
|Θ˜| 6 n 6 K |X |T 6|X |d2 , and thus, we have (B9). To prove
(B10), consider any θ ∈ Θ. By our construction, there
should be a θ˜ ∈ Θ˜ such that x 7→ ρBx (θ˜) and x 7→ ρBx (θ)
belong to the same pii. Therefore, for any x ∈ X T , we
have
‖ρBx (θ)− ρBx (θ˜)‖1








where (a) follows since x 7→ ρBx (θ) and x 7→ ρBx (θ˜) belong
to the same pii, and the diameter of the partition is less
than T−6. Finally, let PX be any PMF over X ; to lower-
bound minθ˜∈Θ˜ I(PX , ρ
B
x (θ˜)) as in (B11), take any θ˜ ∈ Θ˜
and consider θ such that x 7→ ρBx (θ) and x 7→ ρBx (θ˜)
belong to the same pii. To complete the lemma, it is
enough to show that
I(PX , ρ
B






































− 2T−6 log (T 6d)
= I(PX , ρ
B






where (a) follows from Fannes’s inequality which states
that for any two ρ and σ in D(H), if ‖ρ−σ‖1 6 δ 6 e−1,
we have |H(ρ)−H(σ)| 6 δ log(dδ−1).
a. Universal reliability result
We next prove a universal reliability result suitable for
covert communications. Note that we cannot use the re-
sult of [30] directly since the input distribution used to
analyze covert communications changes with the block-
length. Indeed, our inspection of the proof of [30] sug-
gests that the technique cannot be adapted for the covert
case since the the penalty arising from the approxima-
tion of a class of channels dominates the number of bits





Therefore, we use a different approach based on the quan-
tum universal decoder introduced by Hayashi in [31]. We
first state the following lemma from [30] which is a gen-
eral achievability result for cq-channels.
Lemma 7 ([30, Theorem 5.4]). Let x 7→ ρBx be any cq-
channel with input set X , and M be a positive integer.
For all x, let Γx be an operator on HB with 0 6 Γx 6
I, and PX be a probability distribution over X . If F :J1,MK → X is a random encoder whose codewords are
iid according to PX , there exists a “universal” decoder
corresponding to a POVM {Λw}Mw=1 depending on the
operators Γx and the encoder F (not on the channel) such































We next consider a stationary memoryless cq-channel
x 7→ ρBx with T channel uses and for each codeword
x ∈ X T , we aim to construct the operator Γx indepen-
dent of the channel such that we would be able to upper-
bound the right hand side of (B15). We shall follow the
approach in [31], which is based on the following result
from representation theory.
Theorem 4 (Schur-Weyl Duality). Let H be a d-




Ut ⊗ Vt, (B16)
where Y dT , {(t1, · · · , td) ∈ Zd : t1 > · · · > td >
0,
∑d
i=1 ti = T}, Ut is an irreducible representation of
SU(d), and Vt is an irreducible representation of the T th
order symmetric group.
In [31], for all t ∈ Y dT and all T , the author introduced
several quantum states that satisfy universal matrix in-
equalities for all density matrices and all cq-channels.
Since those quantum states are a substantial ingredient of
the construction of our universal decoder, we state here
their definition and properties from [31].
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Definition 2. For t ∈ Y dY , let It be the projection onto
the subspace Ut ⊗ Vt. Define
σt ,
1







Moreover, for x′ = (0, · · · , 0, 1, · · · , 1) ∈ X T with
wt(x′) = m, we define σx′ , σU,T−m ⊗ σU,m. For any
x ∈ X T with wt(x) = m, we suppose x = pix′ where pi is
a permutation of T elements and define σx , Upiσx′U†pi
where Upi is the unitary representation of pi.
Lemma 8. For any density matrix ρ on H and any cq-
channel x 7→ ρBx , we have
T
d(d−1)
2 |Y dT |σU,T  ρ⊗T , (B19)
T |X |
d(d−1)
2 |Y dT |σx  ρBx . (B20)
Proof. See [31, Equation (6) and (7)].
Lemma 9. Fix ζ and λ˜ in ]0, 1[. Let x 7→ ρBx (θ) be a
compound cq-channel with θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ X = {0, 1}
such that λmin(ρ
B
0 ) > λ˜ for all θ ∈ Θ. For a fixed T , let







and F : J1,MK → X T be a random encoder such that
F (1), · · · , F (M) are iid according to P ⊗TX with PX =
Bernoulli(αT ) and αT as in Definition 1.
Then, there exists T0 that depends only on dimH, ζ,
and λ˜ such that for all T > T0,
PF
(∀θ ∈ Θ, Pe(θ) 6 2T−5) > 2
3
. (B22)
Proof. We first consider the compound cq-channel x 7→
ρBx (θ˜) obtained by applying Lemma 6 to the compound
cq-channel x 7→ ρBx (θ). By Lemma 7, for each θ˜ ∈ Θ˜,
the expectation of the probability of error with respect















where Γx , {σx − γσU,T  0} [31]. To upper-bound the
first term in (B23), we split the summation into three
parts based on the weight of the codeword x. In partic-
ular, for two thresholds w` < TαT < wu 6 2TαT , we
obtain with a Chernoff bound∑
x:wt(x)<w`
P ⊗TX (x)tr (ρxΓx) 6
∑
x:wt(x)<w`
P ⊗TX (x) (B24)


















To upper-bound the remaining terms, for QX ∼
Bernoulli(p), let us define








)1−s) 11−s . (B28)
Then, by [31, Equation (18)], we have∑
x:w`6wt(x)6wu




P ⊗TX (x) min
s∈[0,1]
(T + 1)d+sd(d−1)
× |Y dT |2sγse−Tφ(s,
wt(x)
T )





We introduce a result bounding φ(s, p) for small s and p.
Lemma 10. For all λ˜, s˜, p˜ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a univer-
sal constant B > 0 such that for all cq-channels x 7→ ρBx
with λmin(ρ
B
0 ) > λ˜ and for all s 6 s˜ and p 6 p˜ , we have
φ(s, p) > sI(p)−B(ps2 + s3), (B30)
where I(p) , I(QX , ρx) with QX ∼ Bernoulli(p). Fur-





Proof. See Appendix C.
Applying Lemma 10 to (B29), we obtain for all s small
enough,
(T + 1)d






































To upper-bound the second term in (B23), we use the
operator inequality A{A  0}  0 for any Hermitian
operator A. Hence, we have for all x
(σx − γσU,T )Γx  0. (B33)
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This implies that(
σx − γσU,T + γ
































where (a) follows since by Lemma 8,(
γσU,T − γTd(d−1)|Y dT |
(
ρB


































TαT + (T + 1)d


















w` = TαT − (TαT ) 23 , (B38)



























6 2−ω(log T ), (B42)
where the term −ω(log T ) depends on λ˜, ζ, and dimH.
By Markov’s inequality and the union bound, we have
PF
(







By Lemma 6, |Θ˜| is upper-bounded by a polynomial in T .





2−ω(log T ). Finally, by Lemma 6, for all θ ∈ Θ, there
exists θ˜ ∈ Θ˜ such that Pe(θ) 6 Pe(θ˜) + T−5. Thus, for
large enough T , we have
PF
(∀θ ∈ Θ, Pe(θ) 6 2T−5) > 2
3
. (B44)
b. Universal resolvability result
We next prove an asymptotic resolvability result for
covert distributions.
Lemma 11. Fix λ˜ and ζ in ]0, 1[. Consider a cq-channel
x 7→ ρEx with x ∈ X = {0, 1} such that λmin(ρE0 ) > λ˜.
Let PX be the covert distribution in Definition 1, M
′ be
an integer satisfying





and F : J1,M ′K → X T be a random encoder such that
all codewords are distributed according to P ⊗TX indepen-





6 2−ω(log T ), (B46)
where the constant hidden in ω(log T ) depends only on









Proof. The proof is akin to the resolvability part of the
proof of Lemma 4 specialized to the channel from Alice
to Eve. By Lemma 3, we have
EF
(









and for QX ∼ Bernoulli(p), we define































































where (a) follows from [26, Lemma 3.7] and ξ is small
positive number. The following lemma is the counterpart
of Lemma 5 for the channel from Alice to Eve.
Lemma 12. Fix s˜ < 0, p˜ ∈ [0, 1], and λ˜ ∈ [0, 1]. There
exists a universal constant B > 0 such that for all cq-
channels x 7→ ρEx , p ∈ [0, p˜], and s ∈ [s˜, 0], we have
φ(s, p) > −I(p)s−B(ps2 − s3), (B50)
where I(p) , I(PX , ρEx ).
Proof. See Appendix C.













D(ρE1 ‖ρE0 )+ ζ2+
















By choosing s = o(
√
αT )∩ω( log TTαT )[32], the above expres-
sion goes to zero faster than any polynomial.
Lemma 13. Fix ζ and λ˜ in ]0, 1[. Let x 7→ ρEx (θ) be
a compound cq-channel with x ∈ X = {0, 1} and θ ∈ Θ
such that for all θ ∈ Θ, λmin(ρE0 ) > λ˜. Let PX be as in
Lemma 11. Let M ′ be an integer satisfying







and F : J1,MK×J1,M ′K→ X T be a random encoder such
that all codewords are independently distributed according
to P ⊗TX . Then, there exists T0 depending only on dimH,
ζ, and λ˜ such that for all T > T0, we have
PF
(




















Proof. We again consider the compound cq-channel x 7→




















6 2−ω(log T ).
(B54)
By Markov’s inequality and the union bound, we have
PF
(






























= 2−ω(log T ).
(B56)















Thus, for large enough T , we have
PF
(












c. Proof of Theorem 3
We are now ready to provide the proof of the main
result of this section. Our code construction is similar to
[11], which uses wiretap coding to ensure the security of
a covert message. Fix ζ, λ˜B , λ˜E , DB , and DE , and let Θ
be an arbitrary indexing of all cq-channels x 7→ ρBEx sat-
isfying (B1)-(B4) for which the corresponding cq-channel
to θ ∈ Θ is x 7→ ρBEx (θ). Considering the sequence
{αT }T>1 from Definition 1, for a fixed large enough T ,
let PX be Bernoulli(αT ); let F : J1,MK× J1,M ′K→ X T
be a random encoder whose codewords are iid according
to P ⊗TX that encodes two messages W and W
′ uniformly
distributed over J1,MK and J1,M ′K, respectively, to a
codeword X. By Lemma 9, for







> b(1− ζ)αTDBT c, (B60)
we have
PF




where Pe(θ) is the probability that at least one of the
messages W and W ′ is not decoded correctly at the re-
ceiver when the cq-channel corresponding to index θ is
used. Moreover, by Lemma 13, for
























where ρ̂Ew and ρ
E(θ) are defined in the statement of
Lemma 13. Inequalities (B61) and (B64) imply that there
exists a realization f of F such that for all θ ∈ Θ,








Hence, by Lemma 23, we upper-bound the quantum rel-






























To lower-bound the minimum eigenvalue of ρE(θ), we use
Lemma 18 to obtain for large T ,
λmin(ρ
E(θ)) = λmin(αT ρ
E
1 (θ) + (1− αT )ρE0 (θ)) (B68)
> λmin((1− αT )ρE0 (θ))− ‖αT ρE1 (θ)‖1
(B69)





Therefore, for some constant L1 > 0 depending on d and










)⊗T) 6 L1T−4. (B72)
To analyze the secrecy of the protocol, since there is no
public communication and W is the key extracted at Al-
ice’s end, the information leakage to the adversary is
D
(
























where (a) follows since there is no public communica-
tion. For the covertness, first note that by convexity of
quantum relative entropy, we have
D
(











We can subsequently bound D
(
ρE‖ (ρE0 (θ))⊗T) as
D
(
ρE‖ (ρE0 (θ))⊗T) (B78)
= D
(









)⊗T − log (ρE0 (θ))⊗T)) (B79)
6 D
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6 L1T−4 + D
((
ρE(θ)






















































where (a) follows from Pinsker inequality, and (b) follows
from [14].
2. Covert Quantum Tomography
a. Instantiation of a covert estimation protocol









. By our discussion
at the beginning of Section V, if the channel from Alice
to Bob is EA˜→B , the goal of the estimation phase would
be to first verify the conditions (20) and (21), and if they












col will be aborted otherwise. We shall use standard
quantum tomography [22] and adapt it to be covert.
We start the description of the estimation phase by for-
mally defining an estimation protocol. Suppose Alice and
Bob have access to private randomness R distributed
according to PR over R and use T ′ channel uses for
the estimation phase. The estimation protocol consists
of an encoder function f : R → D(H)T ′ for Alice, a
POVM Mr = {M jr }j∈J for each r ∈ R applied by
Bob to his received state ρB when R = r and results
in an output j in J the set of all possible outputs of
the measurement, one function H : J → {0, 1} used
by Bob to verify that (20) and (21) hold, and two es-
timators D̂B : J → R and D̂W : J → R used by












We now explicitly instantiate a covert estimation pro-
tocol. Consider any number of channel uses T ′ and any
quantum channel E : L(H) → L(H) where H is a d-
dimensional Hilbert space. Let E˜1, · · · , E˜d2 be defined
as discussed in the beginning of Section V, i.e., for an or-
thonormal basis |1〉, · · · , |d〉, we let E˜d(n−1)+m , |n〉〈m|.
Our goal is to estimate E(E˜n) for all n ∈ J1, d2K from
which we would have a complete characterization of the
quantum channel E . To do so, the main idea is that Alice
would send some states through Pulse-Position Modula-
tion (PPM) to Bob for which Bob performs quantum
state tomography. More concretely, Alice and Bob first
agree on two integers q and ` such that q` 6 T ′ and sam-
ple an iid sequence U1, · · · , U` from their private random-
ness where each Ui is uniformly distributed over J1, qK.
Alice then transmits the innocent state ρA˜0 on the i
th
channel uses unless
i ∈ I , {U1, U2 + q, · · · , U` + q(`− 1)}. (B87)
To determine the state that should be sent by Alice on
the positions in I, let us define the vectors
|n,m,+〉 , |n〉+ |m〉√
2
(B88)
|n,m,−〉 , |n〉+ i|m〉√
2
(B89)
and consider pure states
S , {|n,m,+〉〈n,m,+| : n 6= m}
∪ {|n,m,−〉〈n,m,−| : n 6= m} ∪ {|n〉〈n| : n ∈ J1, dK},
(B90)
where |S| = 2d2 − d. On the positions in I, in an ar-
bitrary but known order, Alice transmits each state in
S b`/ |S|c times. Then, for each state ρ ∈ S, Bob re-
ceives b`/ |S|c independent copies of E(ρ), and performs
a POVM defined by {ρ˜, I − ρ˜} for each operator ρ˜ ∈ S,˜`, bb`/ |S|c/ |S|c times. Let N̂(ρ, ρ˜) be the number of
times the result of the measurement {ρ˜, I − ρ˜} on E(ρ)
corresponds to ρ˜ and let f̂(ρ, ρ˜) , N̂(ρ, ρ˜)/˜`. Bob subse-




















Since {E˜j : j ∈ J1, d2K} is an orthonormal basis for L(H),
we can write Ê(ρ) , ∑j E˜j λ̂ρ,j for some unique λ̂ρ,j .
Then, for n,m ∈ J1, dK, we define
Ê(E˜d(n−1)+m) ,





Ê(|n〉〈n|) n = m,
(B93)
which is enough to characterize a quantum channel. We
can similarly write E(E˜d(n−1)+m) =
∑
j E˜jλd(n−1)+m,j
for some unique λd(n−1)+m,j . We next attempt to form
an estimation of the χ-representation of the channel E ,









j,k λj′,k′ . (B94)
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j,k λ̂j′,k′ . Finally, for some
τ > 0, we define
H , 1
{














The next theorem establishes bounds on the perfor-
mance of the described covert estimation protocol.
Theorem 5. There exist some ξ > 0 that depends on τ ,
d, λ˜χ, λ˜B, and λ˜E such that
D
(

















H = 1|λmin(χ) 6 λ˜χ − 2τ





DB(E)− 2τ 6 D̂B 6 DB(E),
DE(E) 6 D̂E 6 DE(E) + 2τ
|λmin(χ) > λ˜χ − 2τ, λmin(E(ρA˜0 )) > λ˜B − 2τ
)
> 1− 2−ξ`. (B101)
We shall prove Theorem 5 in Section B 2 b. Note
that (B98) characterizes the covertness of the estimation
protocol by bounding the relative entropy between the
state induced by the estimation protocol and the state
in which there is no communication. (B99) and (B100)
characterize the robustness of estimation since (B99)
bounds the probability that the channel satisfies the re-
quired condition (20) and (21) but Alice and Bob abort
the protocol while (B100) bounds the probability that Al-
ice and Bob run the key generation phase but the channel
does not satisfy the required conditions. Finally, (B101)
characterizes the accuracy of the estimation by bound-
ing the probability that the estimated parameters of the
channel are close to their true values.
As depicted in Fig. 6, there is a technical subtlety in
verifying (20) and (21) because the channel estimation
error in finite number of channel uses prevents us from
testing with absolute certainty that (20) and (21) hold.
In other words, there could exist a set of channels for
which, based on the estimation error, Alice and Bob may
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Protocol correctly aborts with high probability
Protocol correctly continues with high probability
e 
B
<latexit sha1_base64="XUClDvQaS4WZxnFHj0IgnuVqxrc="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="XUClDvQaS4WZxnFHj0IgnuVqxrc="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="XUClDvQaS4WZxnFHj0IgnuVqxrc="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="XUClDvQaS4WZxnFHj0IgnuVqxrc="></latexit>
Protocol may or may not abort, but no compromise in
reliability, secrecy, or covertness
Estimation threshold
e  
<latexit sha1_base64="cqvycTBlDMc Mt1yUtdWDBraRyoA=">AAACbXicbVHLahRBFK3p+IjxNYkIgiKNo5iFme4WQTdCQBc uozhJYHocblfdThepR1N1WzM049e41f/xK/wFq3tmYRIvVHE45z7qnipqJT2l6e9Bt HHl6rXrmze2bt66fefucHvn0NvGcZxwq6w7LsCjkgYnJEnhce0QdKHwqDh91+lHX9F 5ac1nWtQ403BiZCk5UKDmwwf5NymQpBLY5irUCVh+yXkl58NROk77iC+DbA1GbB0H8 +3B21xY3mg0xBV4P83SmmYtOJJc4XIrbzzWwE/hBKcBGtDoZ22/wjJ+FhgRl9aFYyj u2X8rWtDeL3QRMjVQ5S9qHfk/bdpQ+WbWSlM3hIavBpWNisnGnR+xkA45qUUAwJ0Mb 415BQ44BdfOTfFl1/1F7EmDWzgRNurbtsnEh9xEY+UEiOS9s3Vhz5JP6BEcr5JwWb2 ngPBsr3dmxczLxvDuF/w4KMtgeHbR3svg8OU4S8fZx1ej/adr6zfZQ/aE7bKMvWb77 AM7YBPG2Xf2g/1kvwZ/ovvRo+jxKjUarGvusXMRPf8LTCS+eQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="cqvycTBlDMc Mt1yUtdWDBraRyoA=">AAACbXicbVHLahRBFK3p+IjxNYkIgiKNo5iFme4WQTdCQBc uozhJYHocblfdThepR1N1WzM049e41f/xK/wFq3tmYRIvVHE45z7qnipqJT2l6e9Bt HHl6rXrmze2bt66fefucHvn0NvGcZxwq6w7LsCjkgYnJEnhce0QdKHwqDh91+lHX9F 5ac1nWtQ403BiZCk5UKDmwwf5NymQpBLY5irUCVh+yXkl58NROk77iC+DbA1GbB0H8 +3B21xY3mg0xBV4P83SmmYtOJJc4XIrbzzWwE/hBKcBGtDoZ22/wjJ+FhgRl9aFYyj u2X8rWtDeL3QRMjVQ5S9qHfk/bdpQ+WbWSlM3hIavBpWNisnGnR+xkA45qUUAwJ0Mb 415BQ44BdfOTfFl1/1F7EmDWzgRNurbtsnEh9xEY+UEiOS9s3Vhz5JP6BEcr5JwWb2 ngPBsr3dmxczLxvDuF/w4KMtgeHbR3svg8OU4S8fZx1ej/adr6zfZQ/aE7bKMvWb77 AM7YBPG2Xf2g/1kvwZ/ovvRo+jxKjUarGvusXMRPf8LTCS+eQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="cqvycTBlDMc Mt1yUtdWDBraRyoA=">AAACbXicbVHLahRBFK3p+IjxNYkIgiKNo5iFme4WQTdCQBc uozhJYHocblfdThepR1N1WzM049e41f/xK/wFq3tmYRIvVHE45z7qnipqJT2l6e9Bt HHl6rXrmze2bt66fefucHvn0NvGcZxwq6w7LsCjkgYnJEnhce0QdKHwqDh91+lHX9F 5ac1nWtQ403BiZCk5UKDmwwf5NymQpBLY5irUCVh+yXkl58NROk77iC+DbA1GbB0H8 +3B21xY3mg0xBV4P83SmmYtOJJc4XIrbzzWwE/hBKcBGtDoZ22/wjJ+FhgRl9aFYyj u2X8rWtDeL3QRMjVQ5S9qHfk/bdpQ+WbWSlM3hIavBpWNisnGnR+xkA45qUUAwJ0Mb 415BQ44BdfOTfFl1/1F7EmDWzgRNurbtsnEh9xEY+UEiOS9s3Vhz5JP6BEcr5JwWb2 ngPBsr3dmxczLxvDuF/w4KMtgeHbR3svg8OU4S8fZx1ej/adr6zfZQ/aE7bKMvWb77 AM7YBPG2Xf2g/1kvwZ/ovvRo+jxKjUarGvusXMRPf8LTCS+eQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="cqvycTBlDMc Mt1yUtdWDBraRyoA=">AAACbXicbVHLahRBFK3p+IjxNYkIgiKNo5iFme4WQTdCQBc uozhJYHocblfdThepR1N1WzM049e41f/xK/wFq3tmYRIvVHE45z7qnipqJT2l6e9Bt HHl6rXrmze2bt66fefucHvn0NvGcZxwq6w7LsCjkgYnJEnhce0QdKHwqDh91+lHX9F 5ac1nWtQ403BiZCk5UKDmwwf5NymQpBLY5irUCVh+yXkl58NROk77iC+DbA1GbB0H8 +3B21xY3mg0xBV4P83SmmYtOJJc4XIrbzzWwE/hBKcBGtDoZ22/wjJ+FhgRl9aFYyj u2X8rWtDeL3QRMjVQ5S9qHfk/bdpQ+WbWSlM3hIavBpWNisnGnR+xkA45qUUAwJ0Mb 415BQ44BdfOTfFl1/1F7EmDWzgRNurbtsnEh9xEY+UEiOS9s3Vhz5JP6BEcr5JwWb2 ngPBsr3dmxczLxvDuF/w4KMtgeHbR3svg8OU4S8fZx1ej/adr6zfZQ/aE7bKMvWb77 AM7YBPG2Xf2g/1kvwZ/ovvRo+jxKjUarGvusXMRPf8LTCS+eQ==</latexit>e     2⌧





<latexit sha1_base64="NpROWAch7EHpGFEhGLUHDGsXwp4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="NpROWAch7EHpGFEhGLUHDGsXwp4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="NpROWAch7EHpGFEhGLUHDGsXwp4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="NpROWAch7EHpGFEhGLUHDGsXwp4="></latexit>
Figure 6. Testing the conditions (20) and (21)
ensures that if the key generation phase is executed, it is
reliable, secure, and covert.
We conclude this section by analyzing the performance
of a covert key generation protocol obtained by combin-
ing the covert estimation protocol with the universal code
introduced in Section B 1. More precisely, Alice and Bob
first perform the described estimation protocol P over T ′
channel uses. Using O(log T ′) channel uses and O(log T ′)
bits of private common randomness, Bob transmits the
one-time-padded H, D̂B , and D̂W over the public chan-
nel. If H = 0, Alice abort the protocol. If H = 1,
after obtaining D̂B and D̂E , Alice and Bob run the uni-
versal code CT introduced in Theorem 3 for DB = D̂B ,
DE = D̂E , and the lower-bounds on the minimum eigen-
value of ρB0 and ρ
E
0 , λ˜
B − 2τ and λ˜E , respectively. The
rationale behind the conservative choice for the minimum
eigenvalue of ρB0 is that, because to the estimation er-
ror, Alice and Bob might accept the channels for which
λmin(ρ
B
0 ) is slightly less than λ˜B . We characterize the
reliability, secrecy, and covertness of the overall protocol
in the next lemma and provide the poof in Section B 2 b.
Lemma 14. For all channels EA˜→B if we only know
λmin(EA˜→E(ρA˜0 )) > λ˜E, we have
Pe 6 P(H = 1), (B102)









C 6 P(H = 1)T log 1
λ˜E
+ δ, (B104)
where L1, L2 > 0 depend on dimHE and λ˜E, and `max
is the maximum length of the key.
In addition, for a quantum channel EA˜→B with
λmin(EA˜→E(ρA˜0 )) > λ˜E and λmin(EA˜→B(ρA˜0 )) > λ˜B −
2τ , and an estimation protocol P, define  ,
P
(





ρEW ‖(ρE0 )⊗ ρWunif
)
. For the protocol described above,
we have
Pe 6 2T−5 + , (B105)



























b. Proof of Theorem 5 and Lemma 14
To show that the desired parameters of the channel are
approximated properly by their associated estimators, we
first show that the estimated channel Ê defined in (B93)
is close to the true channel E , i.e., for all j and k, with





Lemma 15. For all γ > 0 and κmax ,
maxj,k,j′,k′ |κj
′,k′
j,k |, we have
P
(
∃j, k : |λj,k − λ̂j,k| > γ
)
6 16d4e− 1256 ˜`γ2 , (B108)
and
P
(∃j, k : |χj,k − χ̂j,k| > d2κmaxγ) 6 16d4e− 1256 ˜`γ2 .
(B109)
Proof. We only prove (B108) as (B109) then follows
from the definition of χ̂j,k. Notice first that, by our
construction, the distribution of N̂(ρ, ρ˜) = ˜`f̂(ρ, ρ˜) is
Binomial(tr (ρ˜E(ρ)) , ˜`) for all ρ, ρ˜ ∈ S. Therefore, Ho-
effding’s inequality yields for all γ > 0 that
P
(
|f̂(ρ, ρ˜)− tr (ρ˜E(ρ)) | > γ
)
6 2 exp−2˜`γ2. (B110)
For all n, m, n′, and m′, using the equality
E˜d(n−1)+m = |n,m,+〉〈n,m,+|
+ i|n,m,−〉〈n,m,−| − 1 + i
2




we expand λj,k and λ̂j,k in terms of tr (ρ˜E(ρ)) and f̂(ρ, ρ˜),
respectively, and apply (B110). More precisely, by defi-




























We now fix n′,m′ ∈ J1, dK and ρ ∈ S and for simplicity,






= tr (|+〉〈+|E(ρ))− itr (|−〉〈−|E(ρ))
− 1− i
2
tr (|n〉〈n|E(ρ))− 1− i
2
tr (|m〉〈m|E(ρ)) . (B113)












|f̂(ρ, |+〉〈+|)− if̂(ρ, |−〉〈−|)− 1− i
2

































6 4e− 18 ˜`γ2 .
(B114)
Similarly, to analyze the second term in the right hand
side of (B92), we have
P
(




Thus, the union bound implies that
P
(






6 d(d− 1)4e− 18 ˜`γ2 + de−2˜`γ2 6 4d2e− 18 ˜`γ2 . (B116)
Moreover, because we have
λ̂j,k = λ̂|+〉〈+|,k
+ iλ̂|−〉〈−|,k − 1 + i
2







∃j, k : |λj,k − λ̂j,k| > γ
)
6 16d4e− 1256 ˜`γ2 . (B118)




‖E(ρ)− Ê(ρ)‖1 > d6κmaxγ
)
6 16d4e− 1256 ˜`γ2 , (B119)
P
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where (a) follows from Lemma 21 in Appendix D, and (b)
follows from Lemma 18 in Appendix D. To upper-bound
‖√χ−
√
χ̂‖1, let us define F (x) ,
√








Applying Lemma 22 for f(µ) =
√
µ and A(x) = χ +
22






















Moreover, by Lemma 18, we know that
λmin(A(x)) = λmin(χ+ x(χ̂− χ)) (B131)










If for all j, k, we have |χjk − χ̂jk| 6 d2κmaxγ, then ‖χ−


















6 16d4e− 1256 ˜`γ2 . (B134)
Proof of Theorem 5. Covertness analysis: Let ρEi de-
note Eve’s state during the channel uses from q(i−1)+1
to qi. Since, U1, · · · , U` are independent, then
D
(









We now focus on the block from channel use q(i− 1) + 1
to qi. Define ρ as the state sent by Alice on the position

























































)⊗(j−1) ⊗ (ρρE0 (ρE0 )−1)⊗ (ρE0 )⊗(j˜−j−1) ⊗ (ρE0 ρ (ρE0 )−1)⊗ (ρE0 )⊗(q−j˜))
(B140)





























































































Error analysis: To prove (B99) and (B100), it is
enough to show that
P (|λmin(χ)− λmin(χ̂)| 6 τ




To this end, note that












|χj,k − χ̂j,k| 6 τ
,
(B147)
where (a) follows from [34, Lemma 11.1], and (b) follows
from the triangle inequality. By (B123), we also have
P
(





|χj,k − χ̂j,k| 6 τ
. (B148)
Using (B109), we thus obtain
P (|λmin(χ)− λmin(χ̂)| 6 τ







We now establish bounds on the accuracy of the estimates
D̂B and D̂E when λmin(χ) > λ˜χ − 2τ, λmin(E(ρA˜0 )) >







min(λ˜B − 2τ, λ˜E)
+
d2







By Lemma 19, we can choose γ > 0 independent of
λmax(χ) such that





2 (λmin(χ)− 2τ − d5κmaxγ) 6 . (B152)
24
By Lemma 16 and Lemma 24, we have
P
(
DB(E)− 2τ 6 D̂B 6 DB(E)
DE(E) 6 D̂E 6 DE(E) + 2τ
)
6 32d4e− 1256 ˜`γ2 . (B153)
Since ˜`> `2d2−12d2 − 1, we can choose ξ > 0 small enough
such that the above upper-bound is less than 2−ξ`.
Proof of Lemma 14. We only prove the second part of
the lemma and the proof of the second part can be ob-
tained by the exact same approach. Let Pe(D
B , DE),
S(DB , DE), C(DB , DE) indicate the probability of er-
ror, secrecy, and covertness of the protocol discussed in
the proof of Theorem 3, respectively, when we use the
parameters DB and DE . By the law of total probability,



























where A , {D̂B 6 DB(E), D̂E > DE(E)} ∪ {H = 0},
(a) follows from Theorem 3. For the secrecy, first note
that the estimation phase does not leak any information
about the key. Furthermore, by convexity of the quantum































where (a) follows from Theorem 3, and (b) follows from
the upper-bound S 6 T log 1
λ˜E
+`max. Finally, for covert-
ness, since the estimation and transmission phases are
independent, we have






























3. Proof of Theorem 2
We describe a protocol running over T˜ > 0 channel
uses. Let T ′ = b
√
T˜ c and T = T˜ − T ′ −O(log T ′). Alice
and Bob use the first T ′ +O(log T ′) channel uses for the
estimation protocol described in Section B 2 a for param-
eters q and ` to obtain H as well as estimates DB(E)
and DE(E). If H = 0 the protocol is aborted and if
H = 1, the rest of T channel uses will be used for trans-
mission using the universal protocol as described before
for D̂B , D̂E , λ˜B − 2τ and λ˜W . For a channel satisfying
λmin(χ) > λ˜χ − 2τ, λmin(E(ρA˜0 )) > λ˜B − 2τ , by applying
the second part of Lemma 14 and Theorem 5, for some
ξ > 0, we have
Pe 6 2T−5 + 2−ξ`, (B161)







































is non-empty by definition of αT , we can always find the
sequence T˜ satisfying the conditions in Theorem 2. If
the channel satisfies λmin(χ) > λ˜χ, λmin(E(ρA˜0 )) > λ˜B , by
(B99), with probability 2−ξ`, the number of transmitted
bits is lower-bounded by
(1− 2ζ)(DB(E)−DE(E)− 2τ)αTT. (B164)
If the channel does not satisfy λmin(χ) >
λ˜χ, λmin(E(ρA˜0 )) > λ˜B , by (B100) and the first part of
Lemma 14, we have


















but no key is generated.
Appendix C: Error exponent calculations
Proof of Lemma 5. For a fix T , applying Taylor’s theo-
rem on φ defined in (A48), we have




















QY (y)tr (Ay(s)) . (C3)






































































−3 ln (ρ˜Ey )Ay(s) (ln (ρ˜E))2 +Ay(s) (ln (ρ˜E))3) .
Using Ay(0) = ρ˜
E














(− ln (ρ˜Ey ) ρ˜Ey + ρ˜Ey ln (ρ˜E)) (C10)











− 2 ln (ρ˜Ey ) ρ˜Ey ln (ρ˜E)+ ρ˜Ey (ln (ρ˜E))2) . (C12)
Hence, we have
























−2 ln (ρ˜Ey ) ρ˜Ey ln (ρ˜E)+ ρ˜Ey (ln (ρ˜E))2)
− I(QY , ρ˜Ey )2. (C16)
Note that φ′′(0) implicitly depends on αT the proba-











−2 ln (ρ˜Ey ) ρ˜Ey ln (ρ˜E)+ ρ˜Ey (ln (ρ˜E))2) (C17)
when the input distribution is Bernoulli(α). One can




y ), and ln(ρ˜
E) are continu-

























−2 ln (ρ˜E) ρ˜E ln (ρ˜E)+ ρ˜E (ln (ρ˜E))2) = 0,
(C19)
where (a) follows from Lemma 1. By the mean value
theorem, we know that |h(α) − h(0)| = |h(α)| = h′(β)α
for some 0 < β < α. Since h′ is continuous for a small
neighborhood around zero, it is bounded and therefore,
we have |h(αT )| = O(αT ). Furthermore, Lemma 1 im-
plies that I(QY , ρ˜
E
y )
2 = O(α2T ). Thus, there exists B > 0
such that |φ′′(0)| 6 BαT for T large enough. Notice next
that g, g′, g′′, and g′′′ are jointly continuous functions of
both variables s and αT in a neighborhood around (0,
0). Additionally, since g(0) = 1 when α = 0, we con-
clude that φ′′′ is also continuous in both s and αT in
a neighborhood around (0, 0). Therefore, for B large
enough, |s| small enough and T large enough, we have
|φ′′′(s)| 6 B. Combing φ(0) = 0, φ′(0) = −I(QY , ρ˜Ey ),
|φ′′(0)| 6 BαT , and |φ′′′(η)| 6 B with (C1), we obtain
the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 10. Consider any cq-channel x 7→ ρBx
with λmin(ρ
B
0 ) = λmin > 0. We first show that the cor-
responding function φ is smooth enough to use Taylor
26
theorem. Let us define
A(s, p) , ((1− p) (ρB0 )1−s + p (ρB0 )1−s , s) (C20)







ψ(x, s) , −(1− s) log(x). (C22)
By definition, we have φ(s, p) = (ψ ◦ g ◦ A)(s, p). Ad-
ditionally, all these three functions are from a subset of
a Banach space to a Banach space, which means that
we can consider their Fre´chet derivative. In the follow-
ing lemma, we show that they are infinitely many times
differentiable.
Lemma 17. The functions A, g, and ψ are infinitely
many times differentiable on
[0, 1[×[0, 1[, (C23)
{M ∈ L(H) : M is Hermitian,M  0} × [0, 1[, (C24)
[0, 1[×[0,∞[, (C25)
respectively [35].
Proof. We investigate each function separately.
• Differentiability of A: It is enough to check the dif-









We shall provide explicit expressions for all partial
derivatives of A1 to any order. For any Hermitian
operator ρ ∈ L(H) with ρ  0 and ρ 6= 0, let
ρ =
∑
e λe|e〉〈e| be an eigen-decomposition for ρ. We
define log ρ ,
∑
e:λe 6=0 log(λe)|e〉〈e| which is different
from the usual definition since we disregard the zero
eigenvalues. With this definition, one can check that
for any i > 1, we have
di
dsi
(ρ1−s) = ρ1−s (− log ρ)i . (C26)
Hence, using the linearity of Fre´chet derivative, if we
take i partial derivatives with respect to s and j partial
derivatives with respect to p at any order, the result is




)1−s (− log ρB1 )i
− (ρB0 )1−s (− log ρB0 )i + (ρB1 )1−s (− log ρB1 )i j = 1,
0 j > 2.
(C27)
This also means that all partial derivative are differ-
entiable and therefore continuous. Accordingly, A1 is
infinitely many times Fre´chet differentiable.
• Differentiability of g: Again we only check the dif-






. In this case, it
is more challenging to obtain a closed-form expression
for partial derivatives. However, we will prove that
any partial derivative is a multilinear form mapping
(K1, · · · ,Km) ∈ L(H)m to R and is a summation of









where q and p are polynomial in s, and i, j, and k are
non-negative integers. Using induction on the total
number of partial derivative taken and linearity of the
derivative, it is enough to show that if we take the
derivative of (C28) with respect to s or M , we would
have an expression that is a summation of term of the






















ip(s) + (1− s)p′(s)
(1− s)i+1 tr
(


































Therefore, g1 has partial derivatives of any order. Us-
ing the same argument that we used for A1, we con-
clude that g1 is infinitely many Fre´chet differentiable.
• Differentiability of ψ: ψ is product of two smooth
functions (x, s) 7→ −(1 − s) and (x, s) 7→ log x, and
therefore, it is smooth on its domain.
We next check that A(s, p) lies in the {M ∈ L(H) :
M is Hermitian,M  0} where g is differentiable. By our
assumption that λmin > 0, ρ
B





for s ∈ [0, 1[. Furthermore, since ρB1 
0, we have A(s, p)  0 for all (s, p) ∈ [0, 1[×[0, 1[. Thus,
by chain rule, φ is a smooth function on [0, 1[×[0, 1[. Ap-
ply Taylor theorem, we have
φ(s, p)



























for some τ ∈ [0, p]. Additionally, one can check that
A(s, p) and all its derivatives depend continuously on ρB0
and ρB1 . Since any continuous function achieves its max-
imum on a compact domain, we have
sup









Moreover, from the definition and some calculations,
φ(0, p) = 0, ∂
2φ(0,0)
∂2s = 0, and by [31],
∂φ(0,p)
∂s = I(p).
It implies that there exists B > 0, such that for all cq-
channels x 7→ ρBx with λmin(ρB0 ) > λ˜, we have
φ(s, p) > I(p)s−B (ps2 + s3) . (C35)





Proof of Lemma 12. If we define
A(s, p) ,
(
(1− p) (ρE0 )1−s p (ρE1 )1−s) ((1− p)ρE0 + pρE1 )s
(C36)
g(M) , tr (M) (C37)
ψ(x) , log(x), (C38)
similar to the proof of Lemma 10, one can check that all
these functions are infinitely many times Fre´chet differ-
entiable. Since, φ = ψ ◦ g ◦A, the rest of proof is exactly
similar to that of Lemma 10.
Appendix D: Technical lemmas
Lemma 18. Suppose A and B are Hermitian in L(H).
Then, we have
λmin(A) > λmin(B)− ‖A−B‖2 > λmin(B)− ‖A−B‖1
(D1)
λmax(A) 6 λmax(B) + ‖A−B‖2 6 λmax(B) + ‖A−B‖1
(D2)
Proof. If λmin(A) , λ1 6 · · · 6 λd , λmax(A) and
λmin(B) , γ1 6 · · · 6 γd , λmax(B) are the eigenvalues
of A and B, respectively, then by [36, Corollary 6.3.8],
we have ‖A− B‖21 > ‖A− B‖22 >
∑d
i=1(λi − γi)2 which
results in the desired bounds.
Lemma 19. For any quantum channel E : L(HA) →
L(HA) with χ-representation matrix χ, we have
λmax(χ) 6
√
d, where d , dim(HA).
Proof. Since χ is Hermitian, it admits to an eigen-
decomposition representation, i.e., for some unitary ma-
trix U and real values Λ1, · · · ,Λd2 , we have χi,j =∑d2
k=1 diUi,kU
∗
j,k. By [22, Eq. (8.168)], E has a
Kraus representation E(ρ) = ∑d2i=1EiρE†i for Ei =√
Λi
∑d2















































where (a) follows since U is unitary. Because E is a quan-




iEi = I. Taking the trace
from this equality, we obtain that







Using (D7) and (D8), we conclude that
λmax(χ) = max
i∈J1,d2K Λi 6 ‖Ei‖2 6
√
d. (D9)
Lemma 20. Consider any quantum channel E : L(H)→
L(H) with dimH = d and characterized by E(ρ) =∑
i,j E˜iρE˜
†
jχij. Define another Hilbert space H† spanned
by an orthonormal basis {|j〉 : j ∈ J1, d2K}. Then, up
to a unitary transformation, the complementary channel
E† : L(H)→ L(H†) would be

















Proof. By [22], without loss of generality we can assume
that χ is Hermitian. Therefore, let χ =
∑
j dj |uj〉〈uj | be





































































j is a Kraus representation
for E , and therefore, by [20], a representation for the











Hence, it is enough to show that for some unitary oper-








= U E˜†(ρ)U†. (D15)
Let U ,
∑
j |u˜j〉〈j| where |u˜j〉 ,
∑
i〈uj |i〉|i〉. One can


























































































































































Lemma 21. Let A,B ∈ L(H) and B be Hermitian.
Then,
‖AB‖1 6 σmax(A)‖B‖1, (D26)
where σmax(A) is the maximum singular value of the A.








































Lemma 22. Let I ⊂ R be an interval and f : I → R and
A(x) : R→ L(H) be differentiable functions such A(x) is
Hermitian and its spectrum is included in I for all x. For
any operator norm ‖ · ‖ satisfying max(‖PA‖, ‖AP‖) 6
‖A‖ where A is an arbitrary operator and P is a projec-







Proof. We use a formula in [20] for the derivative of an
operator-valued function. Let f : R→ R and A(x) : R→












where the summation is taken over all eigenvalues of
A(x), PA(x)(ν) is the projector onto the subspace of all
eigenvectors corresponding to ν, and
f [1](ν, η) =
{
f(ν)−f(η)
ν−η ν 6= η
f ′(ν) ν = η
. (D36)


















|f [1](ν, η)| ‖A′(x)‖ ,
(D37)
where (a) follows from our assumption that
max(‖PA‖, ‖AP‖) 6 ‖A‖. By the mean value
theorem, we also have that f [1](ν, η) = f ′(µ) for some µ
between ν and η. Thus,∑
ν,η




Lemma 23. Suppose ρ and σ are two density matrices
on Hilbert space H with dimH = d such that suppρ ⊂
suppσ and ‖ρ− σ‖1 6  6 e−1. Then,
D(ρ‖σ) 6  log d
λmin(σ)
. (D39)
Proof. Since supp(ρ) ⊂ supp(σ), we have
D(ρ‖σ) = tr (ρ(log ρ− log σ)) (D40)
= −H(ρ) +H(σ)− tr ((ρ− σ) log σ) (D41)
(a)
6  log d

− tr ((ρ− σ) log σ) (D42)






where (a) follows from Fannes inequality.
Lemma 24. Suppose ρ, ρ′, σ, σ′ ∈ D(H) with dimH =
d, supp(ρ) ⊂ supp(σ), and supp(ρ′) ⊂ supp(σ′). Let
‖ρ−ρ′‖1 6 , ‖σ−σ′‖1 6 , and λmin(σ) be the minimum


















Proof. By definition, we have
|D(ρ‖σ)− D(ρ′‖σ′)|
= | −H(ρ) +H(ρ′)− tr (ρ log σ) + tr (ρ′ log σ′) |
6 | −H(ρ) +H(ρ′) |+ |tr ((ρ− ρ′) log σ) |
+ |tr (ρ′(log σ′ − log σ)) .|
(D45)
By Fannes inequality, we have
| −H(ρ) +H(ρ′) |
6 1
2







Furthermore, Cauchy-Schwartz inequality for Hilbert-
Schmidt inner-products implies that
|tr ((ρ− ρ′) log σ) | 6 ‖ρ− ρ′‖2‖ log σ‖2 (D47)
6 ‖ρ− ρ′‖1‖ log σ‖2 (D48)
6 ‖ρ− ρ′‖1d log 1
λmin(σ)
. (D49)
Using Cauchy-Schwartz again, we obtain
|tr (ρ′(log σ′ − log σ)) | 6 ‖ρ′‖2‖ log σ′ − log σ‖2 (D50)
6 ‖ log σ′ − log σ‖2. (D51)
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To upper-bound ‖ log σ′ − log σ‖2, let us define F (x) ,
log(σ + x(σ′ − σ)) for t ∈ [0, 1]. Then,





where (a) follows from mean value theorem of multi-
variable functions. Applying Lemma 22 for f , log and
A(x) = σ + x(σ′ − σ), we obtain




λmin(σ + x(σ′ − σ))‖σ
′ − σ‖2 (D55)
6 d2 1
λmin(σ + x(σ′ − σ))‖σ
′ − σ‖1. (D56)
Finally, for x ∈ [0, 1], we have
λmin(σ + x(σ
′ − σ)) 6 λmin(σ)− ‖x(σ′ − σ)‖2 (D57)
6 λmin(σ)− ‖σ′ − σ‖1. (D58)
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